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Abstract
Since WWII, Alaska has witnessed dramatic influxes and reductions in military personnel 
and funding. This thesis explores the drivers of these events. It applies two theories to analyze 
the trends: realist theory from international relations and the advocacy coalition framework from 
public policy. The thesis uses a case study framework and process-tracing to analyze three 
different time periods in Alaska’s history: 1) World War II (1940-1945), 2) the early Cold War 
era (1950-1958), and 3) the immediate post-Cold War era (1993-1999). This thesis argues that 
the level of international threat accounts for the United States’ decisions to increase or decrease 
its military forces, while the strength of advocacy coalitions comprised of a diverse array of 
actors determines the amount of military personnel and funding transferred to Alaska.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Secretary of the Air Force announced in April 2015 that Eielson Air Force Base, near 
Fairbanks, Alaska, would house a squadron of the newly developed F35 Lightning II, an 
advanced multi-role tactical aircraft. The Secretary stated that “Alaska combines a strategically 
important location with a world-class training environment.”1 Stationing these aircraft in Alaska 
will increase the number of military personnel in the state by three thousand and could bring an 
additional $1.3 billion in defense spending. This plan would place the highly advanced stealth 
fighter in close proximity to China, Russia, and North Korea, which the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy named as three of the five major threats facing the United States today.2
In July 2015, the Pentagon announced that it would reduce the U.S. Army by forty 
thousand soldiers, and over two thousand would come from the unit stationed at Fort Richardson, 
located in Anchorage, Alaska.3 However, after Alaska’s Congressional delegation pressured the 
top military generals responsible for assessing the country’s strategic needs, the Pentagon 
announced that it would spare Alaska from these cuts. Alaska’s Congressional delegation had 
stressed the need for a strong military presence in Alaska, owing to the threat of North Korea and 
the growing threat of Russia.
1 “Alaska F-35s,” Fairbanks North Star Borough, updated March 27, 2018, http://www.alaskaf35s.com/.
2 Erica Martinson, “Air Force OKs F-35 Fighter Jet Squadrons at Eielson Air Force Base,” Anchorage Daily News, 
April 4, 2016, https://www.adn.com/military/article/air-force-oks-f-35-fighter-jet-squardrons-eielson-air-force- 
base/2016/04/04/; Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018).
3 Sydney Freedberg, “Army Bases Bleed, Then BRAC Comes,” Breaking Defense, October 21, 2015, 
https://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/army-bases-bleed-then-brac-comes/. Erica Martinson, “It’s Official: The 
Army’s 4-25th Stays at Full Firepower in Alaska,” Anchorage Daily News, April 7, 2017, 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/military/2017/04/07/its-official-the-armys-4-25th-stays-at-full-firepower-in- 
alaska/.
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Thus, within a few months, the Department of Defense issued two separate 
announcements greatly impacting the State of Alaska. The U.S. government has made numerous 
decisions regarding the U.S. military presence in Alaska since the Alaska Purchase in 1867.
This led me to my research question: What explains increases and decreases of military 
strength in Alaska over time? This thesis explores the historical changes in Alaskan military 
strength and the significance of Alaska to U.S. national security. It argues that both international 
and domestic factors influence the level of military strength in Alaska.
Alaska has played a key role in United States national defense since World War II. Its 
strategic importance stems in part from the fact Alaska borders the North Pacific Great Circle 
Route in the Pacific, which provides the fastest travel time for ships, planes, and even missiles 
between East Asia, where the greatest threats to U.S. security lie, and the contiguous forty-eight 
states of America. In the middle of the North Pacific Great Circle Route lies Alaska, as seen on 
the map below. Alaska also contains a majority of the missile defense technology in the North to 
protect against potential threats from East Asia. Owing to Alaska’s proximity to these major 
threats, the state has had enduring strategic significance for the US government.
During World War II, U.S. military soldiers were stationed in Alaska to prevent a 
potential invasion of the western United States and Canada from the two Aleutian Islands, Kiska 
and Attu, that the Japanese had captured in 1942. Later in the war, Alaska became a staging point 
to harass the Japanese northern islands with continuous bombing on bases located there. These 
attacks kept the Japanese preoccupied, deterring them from sending additional troops to other 
theaters of the war. The Japanese retained a strong presence in the Northern Pacific due to the 
fear that the remaining soldiers in Alaska would invade its homeland.4
4 Brian Garfield, Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Fairbanks, AK: University of 
Alaska Press, 2010), 394-395.
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Figure 1.1: The North Pacific Great Circle Route.
Source: “Alaska’s Location,” Alaska History & Cultural Studies, Alaska Humanities Forum, 
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/geography/alaskas-location.
After World War II, Alaska became the first line of defense against the growing threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. This threat ultimately led to the Cold War. In the early years of the 
Cold War, North Korea invaded South Korea, and again Alaska was the closest location to stage 
troops to defend America against the spread of communism. Throughout the Cold War, 
increasingly advanced technology took the place of large military ground forces in both the 
United States and foreign countries. However, Alaska remained the best place for the military to 
monitor and defend against the growing aircraft and ballistic missile threat from the Soviet 
Union.5
After the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the pressure from East Asia 
appeared to diminish, but as seen in the current U.S. defense strategy, these threats have
5 Lyman Woodman, Duty Station Northwest: The U.S. Army in Alaska and Western Canada, 1867-1987, vol. 3, 
1945-1987 (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Historical Society, 1996); Jonathan M. Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern 
Frontier: The Military in Alaska’s History, 1867-1987 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988).
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resurfaced. The 2018 United States National Defense Strategy points out that the United States 
faces five major threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism. Three of these major 
threats lie in East Asia. The Strategy explains that to counter North Korea’s ballistic missile 
threat the United States must devote additional resources to its missile defense program,6 with 
much of this missile defense located in Alaska. Based on the proximity of Alaska to these 
potential adversaries (Figure 1.2), Alaska provides the best location for monitoring and defense 
capabilities.
Source: Laurel J. Hummel, “The U.S. Military as Geographical Agent: The Case of Cold War Alaska,” 
Geographical Review 95, no. 1 (2005)
Although Alaska has historically played an important part in national defense, it has 
experienced fluctuations in military troops and national defense spending. Before World War II, 
Alaska maintained only a 200-man garrison in Southeast Alaska. Additionally, these troops did
6 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States.”
4
not have large weaponry to defend against any occupying force. During World War II, troop 
levels increased to over 150,000 personnel. Troop numbers, however, would subsequently drop 
to around nineteen thousand after the end of the World War II. Following North Korea’s 
invasion of South Korea in 1950, the military personnel in the territory would rise again to over 
fifty thousand. As the Cold War progressed, the advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 
defensive monitoring technology took priority over a robust ground fighting force. As this 
technology took precedence, military personnel levels in Alaska would decline to twenty 
thousand troops and remain there for the duration of the Cold War.7 These steep increases and 
decreases diverge from the ebb and flow of U.S. military personnel nationally, emphasizing 
Alaska’s unique role in U.S. national defense, as seen in the figures below.
14000000
Figure 1.3 -  Military personnel numbers at the national level, 1940 -1998.8
7 Laurel J. Hummel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape: The Unwritten Legacy of the Cold War” (PhD diss. 
University of Colorado, 2002); “Dod Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications,” Defense Manpower Data 
Center, Department of Defense, updated Fedruary 1, 2018, https://www.dmdc.osd.miPappj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.
8 Infonnation in figures comes from Hummel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; Defense Manpower Data Center, 
“Dod Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications.”
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Figure 1.4 -  Military personnel numbers at the Alaska level, 1940-1998.9
Between 1940 and 1945, at the national level, troop strength experienced a strong 
increase over two years, with a sharp decrease late in 1945, whereas in Alaska troop strength 
shot up in 1942, peaked in 1943, and then fell sharply. During the beginning of the Cold War, an 
increase in troop strength took place at both the national and state level; however, the numbers in 
Alaska remained high for a longer period of time, as numbers at the national level saw a gradual 
decrease after only two years. Then, in 1958, military personnel balanced out and remained 
relatively consistent at the national and state levels, as defense spending became much more 
dynamic.
Between 1941 and 1945, the United States government spent close to $53 billion (2017 
dollars)10 during the four years on national defense in Alaska.11 At the beginning of the Cold
9 Ibid.
111 All monetary figures in this thesis are in 2017 dollars.
11 Claus-M. Naske andHennanE. Slot nick, Alaska: .1 History (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 
186.
6
War, defense spending would rise to around $6 billion in Alaska. Expenditures would slightly 
decrease to $4 billion in Alaska at the end of the Korean War. As technology expanded during 
the Cold War, national defense spending would continue to rise to over $6 billion in the state by 
the end of the Cold War.12 The fall of the Soviet Union, however, would cause another 
downward turn in spending in Alaska to a low of $2 billion by 1998.13 Again, these periods of 
increases and decrease in national defense spending in Alaska do not correlate with total national 
level defense expenditures.
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Figure 1.5: National Defense spending at the national level, 1953-1998 (millions of dollars).14
12 Hummel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”
13 “Consolidated Federal Funds Reports,” U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Coimnerce, updated March 9, 2018 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/time-series/cffr.All.html.
14 Infonnation in figures comes from Hummel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; U.S. Census Bureau, 
“Consolidated Federal Funds Reports.”
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Figure 1.6: National defense spending at the Alaska state level 1953-1998 (millions of dollars).15
Starting in 1953, a decrease in defense expenditures occurred at both the national and 
state levels; however, in Alaska these expenditures dropped more dramatically. Throughout the 
Cold War, Alaska defense spending remained relatively stable, but at the national level, a spike 
occurred in 1965 coinciding with the Vietnam War. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a 
significant drop in defense spending occurred at the state level, whereas at the national level the 
drop occurred much more gradually.
This thesis uses process-tracing within the case study framework to analyze three 
different time periods in Alaska’s history that exhibited a major increase or decrease in military 
personnel or defense spending. This thesis analyzes the time periods of 1) World War II (1940- 
1945), 2) the early Cold War era (1950-1958), and 3) the immediate post-Cold War era (1993- 
1999). This thesis uses two theories to explain the evolution of Alaska’s military capabilities:
15 Ibid.
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realist theory from international relations and the advocacy coalition framework from public 
policy.
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) provides a lens to understand how multiple 
actors, interest groups, and the media influence national policy change.16 ACF also accounts for 
external shocks, like terrorist attacks, and how a coalition can use these events to steer decisions 
towards its preferred policy change.17 An effective advocacy coalition contains strong influential 
leaders and an engaged media working towards a common goal. An individual’s personality, 
willingness to engage with decision makers, and work ethic play a part in how much power an 
advocacy coalition will have on an intended outcome. Conversely, unfocused leaders can hurt 
the prospects and destabilize a coalition. Additionally, the media and its willingness to support 
the cause of a coalition could make or break an effective coalition.
Realism provides explanatory power for why a country chooses certain national defense 
policies, such as increasing or decreasing the military presence or defense spending. It argues 
that when a country is threatened with the use of force to either inflict harm or dominate, it will 
decide to increase its defenses. Correspondingly, when a country eliminates a threat, it no longer 
has a reason to retain a strong military for deterrence reasons, rather a force only powerful 
enough to remain the dominant power.
During World War II, the United States faced international threats from the Axis powers, 
which caused the government to increase its national defensive capabilities. Prior to and during 
the first three years of World War II, a strong and influential coalition advocated for some of 
these military assets to go to Alaska. Due to this international threat and coalition, a significant
16 Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier, “A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” in Handbook o f 
Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2006), 123.
17 Elizabeth Albright, “Policy Change and Learning in Response to Extreme Flood Events in Hungary: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach “ The Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 3 (2011): 487.
9
increase in military troops and spending took place in Alaska. In the latter phases of the war, 
both a diminished international threat and a destabilized coalition led to a drastic decrease of 
military personnel in the Northern Pacific.
Following World War II and into the Cold War, Alaska once again took the spotlight as 
the front line of defense against the growing threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of 
communism. This perceived growing international threat once again led the United States to 
increase its military posture around the world, including Alaska. Different players and different 
journalists formed a coalition for Alaska, and they wielded enough influence to convince 
Congress to increase U.S. defensive capabilities in Alaska once again. This threat and strong 
coalition secured a high level of military personnel in Alaska for a longer time, while the rest of 
the nation saw a steady decrease in troop strength. Military strength eventually declined in 
Alaska, by 1957, owing again to a disengaged coalition.
During the Cold War, Alaska became a state within the United States. Oil revenues, 
along with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, led to complacency within the coalition that 
had lobbied strongly for national defense expenditures in Alaska. Military expenditures in the 
state thus fell in the 1990s.
Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide a historical background of the military in Alaska, 
focusing on the increases and decreases of military personnel and defense expenditures from 
Alaska’s purchase in 1867 until 2017. Chapter 3 will provide an overview of realism, the 
advocacy coalition framework, and the approach of process-tracing within a case study. Chapters 
4-6 present the case study eras of military personnel numbers and expenditures in Alaska. 
Chapter 7 concludes this study and provides implications for policy and research.
10
Chapter 2: History of Military Power in Alaska
2.1 Introduction
On the breezy morning of October 18, 1867, 250 well-armed American soldiers faced a 
formation of approximately 100 Russian troops across a small field on Castle Hill in New 
Archangel (now Sitka), Alaska. These soldiers were not prepared to fight, but rather to 
participate in the ceremony transferring the Alaska Territory from Russia to the United States. 
With the raising of the American flag over New Archangel, the transfer ceremony concluded, 
and Alaska belonged to the United States. This 250 American soldier unit would begin the long 
history of U.S. military power in Alaska.1
The history of world, national, and state events since Alaska’s purchase provides the 
context for defense-related decisions made in Washington, D.C. This time period illuminates the 
significant foreign threats to the United States and why the military in Alaska became so 
important to the nation’s defense. This history also highlights the leaders who have recognized 
Alaska’s strategic significance and have lobbied for an increased military presence and 
investment in Alaska, as well as events impacting U.S. defense resources in Alaska. The chapter 
will account for the buildups and drawdowns of the military personnel in Alaska since World 
War II, depicted in the figure below.
Additionally, this chapter will examine defense spending in Alaska, displayed in the 
figure below. Prior to the 1940s, Alaska did not play a dominant role in the national defense of 
the United States. Also, because the U.S. Coast Guard’s budget falls under the Department of 
Homeland Security, rather than the Department of Defense, this chapter will not address the
1 Lyman Woodman, Duty Station Northwest: The U.S. Army in Alaska and Western Canada, 1867-1987, vol. 1: 
1867-1917 (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Historical Society, 1996), 25; Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 
5; Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 95.
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Coast Guard’s maritime law enforcement and search and rescue operations in Alaska.2 This 
chapter analyzes only Department of Defense expenditures and their effects on Alaska.
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Military Troops in Alaska, 1940-2017.3
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Figure 2.2: Defense spending in Alaska, 1953-2016 (millions of dollars).4
2 The Coast Guard can be assigned to the Department of Defense by the President or Congress, this has only 
happened twice. Once during World War, I and the second during World War II.
3 Infonnation in figure comes from Hmmnel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; Defense Manpower Data Center, 
“Dod Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications.”
4 Information in figure comes from Hmmnel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; U.S. Census Bureau, 
“Consolidated Federal Funds Reports.”
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2.2 Military Presence from the Purchase o f Alaska to World War II Era (1867-1939)
Brevet Major General Jefferson C. Davis5 and his unit had complete jurisdiction over the 
citizens and territory of Alaska from immediately after the Alaska Purchase ceremony until the 
departure of the military in 1877. The War Department6 agreed to this temporary military 
occupation, with the understanding that Congress would soon pass a resolution to establish a 
civil government in Alaska. However, this civil government would not develop for another 
seventeen years.7 While in Alaska, the Army provided protection for U.S. citizens residing in the 
newly acquired territory, including Alaska Natives. General Davis’s orders, however, clarified 
that the Army would prioritize the safety of non-Native residents of the district: “past history has 
shown ... difficulties have occurred in this Territory between the natives and foreign settlers ... 
and if any member of a tribe maltreat a citizen of the United States, the whole tribe, especially its 
Chief, will be held responsible.”8 To protect U.S. citizens from what his direct supervisor’s 
orders described as “aboriginal and uncivilized Indians,” General Davis established military 
posts at the abandoned Russian trading posts. Because these posts lay primarily in the Gulf of 
Alaska, this left the majority of Alaska without a significant American military presence. Over 
the first ten years of the Army occupation, the military troop presence rose to a height of six 
hundred men.9 Many leaders in the U.S. Congress thought that this size force in Alaska was 
excessive. Such a large military presence placed an undue economic burden on the United States, 
given that only minor problems occurred between the military and Alaska Natives. Prior to the
5 General Jefferson C. Davis was unrelated to the Confederate President Jefferson F. Davis
6 The War Department and the Department of the Navy were two separate organizations in the U.S. government 
until after World War II when they were combined into the Department of Defense.
7 Jeannette Nichols, Alaska: A History o f  Its Administration, Exploitation, and Industrial Development During Its 
First H alf Century under the Rule o f  the United States (New York, NY: Russell & Russell Inc., 1963), 35.
8 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, vol. 1: 1867-1917, 347.
9 U.S. Army Alaska, The U.S. Army in Alaska, Pamphlet 360-5 (Seattle, WA: U.S. Army Alaska Headquarters, 
Information Office, 1972), 13.
13
Alaska Purchase, Russians and Tlingit10 had previously had troubled relations. Some Tlingit 
blamed the exclusive use of “firewater” (liquor) traded for the animal skins they provided the 
Russians for these troubled relations. Following the Alaska purchase, however, the Tlingit 
people invited General Davis on multiple occasions to visit, demonstrating a desire for friendly 
relations.11 In 1877, President Hays, for economic reasons and in response to an uprising on the 
Nez Perce Native American tribe in Idaho, decided to remove most of the U.S. troops from 
Alaska and turned the jurisdiction of the territory over to the Treasury Department.12
The Revenue Cutter Service, an armed customs enforcement agency, worked under the 
Treasury Department from 1790 to 1915 to enforce federal tariffs and trading laws and to 
prevent smuggling in Alaska. The Revenue Cutter Service merged with the U.S. Life-Saving 
Service and formed the U.S. Coast Guard in 1915.13 Once the Army left Alaska, the Revenue 
Cutter Service remained the only armed government agency in Alaska to enforce the laws in the 
newly acquired territory, armed only with two cases of rifles and two boxes of ammunition. 
According to Alaska historian Jeannette Padock Nichols, the departure of the well-armed troops 
emboldened the Alaska Natives near Sitka, which threatened the citizens who lived in the 
vicinity.14 The Cutter Service, however, had virtually no experience in administering law and 
order on land due to its maritime focus. From the first day of the new leadership change, the 
Cutter Service petitioned Congress and the Treasury Department for additional resources to 
fulfill its new responsibility of protecting and governing Alaska. The chief Cutter Service agent 
William Morris, called for these additional resources due to what he viewed as an “exceedingly
10 The Tlingit are the indigenous people of Southeast Alaska. The Tlingit had the most interaction with the Russians 
and then the Americans in the late 1800s before expeditions were conducted of interior Alaska.
11 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, vol. 1: 1867-1917, 50.
12 U.S. Army Alaska, The U.S. Army in Alaska, 21; Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 109; Nichols, Alaska, 59.
13 “The Coast Guard: America’s Oldest Maritime Defenders,” U.S. Coast Guard History, U.S. Coast Guard, updated 
March 29, 2018, https://www.gocoastguard.com/about-the-coast-guard/learn-the-history.
14 Nichols, Alaska, 59.
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dangerous and alarming” situation now that the armed service had departed.15 After two years of 
no reply for assistance from Congress or the Treasury Department, Morris requested assistance 
from the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy agreed to assist in the protection 
and administration of Alaska until Congress could approve a civil government establishment. 
Navy leadership believed this resolution would come to pass relatively soon. However, not until 
five years later, in 1884, did Congress pass legislation to establish a civil government in Alaska, 
ending military rule in the district. The 1884 Organic Act provided Alaska with a feeble civil 
government that would prove incapable of administering the district in the coming decades, in 
particular owing to massive in-migration during the Klondike Gold Rush.16
The District of Alaska’s administration consisted of a governor, secretary, chief justice 
with four lower-court judges, and a marshal with four deputies to govern an area one-fifth the 
size of the continental United States. In Nichols’ assessment, the 1884 Organic Act’s 
inadequacies “evolved from a composite of honest intentions, ignorance, stupidity, indifference, 
and quasi-expediency.”17 Congressmen clarified that Congress had provided “such laws as we 
thought the few inhabitants and scattered population, of that Territory needed.”18 In all fairness, 
Congress could not have predicted the discovery of gold in the Yukon Territory that led to one of 
the greatest gold rushes in United States history.
A small number of Army soldiers remained in the territory after the Army’s 1877 exit, to 
meet the U.S. War Department’s interest in tracking meteorological data in Alaska and to 
manage weather stations. These troops consisted of Army Signal Corps personnel who 
conducted geographical expeditions to collect meteorological data. The Army had begun
15 Ibid.
16 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 65.
17 Nichols, Alaska, 72.
18 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 117.
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collecting weather data in 1819 for the Smithsonian Institute. After twenty years of collecting 
meteorological data, the Institute reported that weather phenomena followed certain rules and 
laws, making weather predictable. This knowledge would lead, in 1870, to Congress tasking the 
U.S. military with gathering weather data because the military had the most widespread 
personnel of any government organization.19
In Alaska, military expeditions established five weather stations around Alaska beginning 
in 1870. The military continued to establish weather stations throughout Alaska, even building 
one on the Aleutian Islands’ westernmost island of Attu, which would eventually provide the 
location of the first enemy occupation of U.S. territory in over one hundred years.20 These 
weather stations occupied the time of the small military presence in Alaska until a larger force 
returned in 1897.
Meanwhile, after the fledgling civil government took over in 1884, lawlessness grew in 
Alaska. The limited civil law enforcement personnel could not oversee the ever-growing 
population of itinerant prospectors searching for gold. In the early 1890s, the residents and 
leaders of Alaska began to petition the President and Congress to provide a military presence to 
address pervasive lawlessness. Based on local concerns of violence and civil disorder, the 
President and the Secretary of War decided to return troops to Alaska.21 The War Department 
established a military district in northern Alaska in 1897 to help monitor and sometimes work 
with the miners to bring order to Alaska. The military established a post at St. Michaels and 
another near Skagway to begin this new endeavor in Alaska.22
19 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, vol. 1: 1867-1917, 250
20 U.S. Army Alaska, The A rm y’s Role in the Buiding o f Alaska, Pamphlet 360-5 (Seattle, WA: U.S. Army Alaska 
Headquarters, Information Office, 1969), 23.
21 Galen Roger Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 
1867-1945 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2003), 8.
22 Nichols, Alaska, 143-44.
16
Over the next twenty years, this contingent of nearly one thousand troops would again 
protect the peace, acting more like a law enforcement agency than a national defense 
organization. The military built roughly a dozen posts throughout Alaska at major gold rush 
sites, including Juneau, Fairbanks, and Nome. During this time, the military recognized the 
difficulty of communicating among bases and to the contiguous United States -  or Outside, as 
residents called the contiguous United States -  and resupplying many of the remote outposts that 
had been built. Consequently, the military began constructing a major road system and telegraph 
line to link the military forts in Alaska.23 While working on the telegraph line, Lieutenant 
William (Billy) Mitchell, who was the first person of influence to recognize Alaska’s strategic 
location, and who would go on to become the father of the United States Air Force, gained his 
first direct impressions of Alaska.
During the late 1890s, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt believed that 
the Atlantic region would generate the most threats to United States defense; thus, he rarely 
mentioned Alaska. Owing to Japan’s preoccupation with the Russo-Japanese war, Roosevelt 
dismissed the rising Asian island nation as a threat to the United States. Roosevelt thought that 
the Japanese would become “a great new force in eastern Asia,” after its victory over Russia,24 
balancing the power in the Pacific. After becoming President in 1901, he convinced Congress of 
this view, so Congress refused to allocate funds for increased defenses in Alaska. Additionally, 
the Navy sought to establish a port on the Aleutian Island of Kiska in the early 1900s to use as a
23 Claus-M. Naske, Paving Alaska’s Trails: The Work o f the Alaska Road Commission (Lanham, MD: United Press 
of America, 1986), 1.
24 Theodore Roosevelt, “Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt Jr.,” in The Letters o f  Theodore Roosevelt, ed. 
Elting Morison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 72.
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coal mine and also in case of war with Japan, but this initiative never came to fruition due to the 
Atlantic-focused mindset of Congress and the President.25
Although Roosevelt perceived no international threat to Alaska, Congress wanted to use 
the military to foster the territory’s economic development by providing infrastructure.26 
Therefore the military’s mission changed from administrating and enforcing law to providing 
railroad, roads, trails, and communications to and within the Last Frontier.27 These projects 
contributed significantly not only to Alaska’s economic development, but also the standard of 
living in the district. As one Alaska geographer observed, “[infrastructure improvements as a 
result of the military presence changed how Alaskans were able to live, work, communicate, and 
travel.”28 The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 would put Alaska’s needs on hold, however.
After the conclusion of World War I, U.S. defense expenditures dropped, leading to the 
closure of several bases in Alaska. The mayor of Nome, Edgar Holt, protested the closing of 
nearby Fort Davis. He used various arguments to dissuade the federal government from shutting 
down the base and provided economic data showing the effect the closure would have on the 
community. He also noted the area’s proximity to foreign shores. Mayor Holt believed “the 
Siberian situation may without warning require military protection,”29 referring to the Russian 
civil war taking place at this time. Furthermore, the U.S. government increasingly recognized the 
threat of a rising Japan to the Asian region, and in 1922, signed a treaty with Japan banning any 
new bases or improvements to current bases in the Pacific.30 During this interwar period, the
25 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 9. The U.S. Navy used coal powered ships through World War I until all 
Naval Vessels were switch to oil by the end of the war.
26 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 79.
27 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 1: 1867-1917, 277.
28 Laurel J. Hummel, “The U.S. Military as Geographical Agent: The Case of Cold War Alaska,” Geographical 
Review 95, no. 1 (2005): 60.
29 Lyman Woodman, Duty Station Northwest: The U.S. Army in Alaska and Western Canada, 1867-1987, vol. 2: 
1918-1945 (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Historical Society, 1996), 15.
30 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 12.
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military presence in Alaska would drop to two hundred soldiers, all of whom were located at 
Chilkoot Barracks in Haines. During this time, this base contained the largest garrison and the 
military wanted a symbol of military strength to remain in Alaska.31 The soldiers located there 
only conducted garrison duties that included physical fitness and weapons proficiency.32 These 
soldiers encompassed the only military defensive capabilities in Alaska when Germany invaded 
Poland in 1939.
Many leaders in Washington D.C. advocated for increases in U.S. defense capabilities 
and expenditures in Alaska during the 1920s and 1930s to counter the perceived threat from 
Japan. Yet U.S. military strength in the Territory dwindled, owing to widespread public support 
for isolationism and Congressional aversion to large defense expenditures after World War I.33 In 
1933, Anthony Dimond became Alaska’s delegate to the U.S. Congress. Under the Organic Acts 
that governed Alaska at the time, the people could vote for a representative to Congress, but the 
delegate did not have voting power within Congress. 34 Still, Alaska’s delegate could introduce 
bills, including appropriations for the Territory of Alaska.35 Without a vote, Delegate Dimond 
had to rely on his personality and powers of persuasion to convince key officials that Alaska 
could contribute to the nation’s defense. Although Dimond persuaded key members of Congress 
and military leaders of Alaska’s strategic importance, he failed to persuade a majority of
31 U.S. Army Alaska, The U.S. Army in Alaska, 74.
32 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 48.
33 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 12.
34 The Organic Acts of 1884 instituted a civil government in Alaska, which ended military rule in Alaska. However, 
it wasn’t until 1906 that Congress voted to allow Alaska to send a non-voting delegate to Washington. In 1912 
Congress also designated Alaska as a Territory. Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska Politics & 
Government (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 39-41.
35 Clive S. Thomas and Laura C. Savatgy, “Understanding Alaska and It’s Political Environment,” in Alaska Politics 
and Public Policy: The Dynamics o f Beliefs, Institutions, Personalities, and Power, ed. Clive S. Thomas (Fairbanks, 
AK: University of Alaska Press, 2016), 39; Mary C. Mangusso, “Anthony J. Dimond: A Political Biography” (PhD 
diss., Texas Tech University, 1978), 141.
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Congress of the nation’s need to defend Alaska more vigorously; therefore, every appropriations
bill died.36
Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, now a respected member of the Army Air Corps, also 
advocated for the importance of air power in Alaska. During a hearing before Congress in 1935, 
Mitchell spoke his iconic line, “I believe in the future he who holds Alaska will rule the world, 
and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.”37 With Alaska lying on the 
North Pacific Great Circle Route between the continental United States and Northeast Asia, 
Mitchell believed that the Aleutian Islands could defend the heart of the United States. Yet his 
words fell on deaf ears. Many lawmakers in Washington D.C. failed to predict Alaska’s 
increasing strategic significance. Throughout the 1930s, Dimond and Mitchell would continue to 
pressure Congress to improve U.S. defenses in Alaska.
During the interwar years, the U.S. military developed war plans for various regions of 
the world, establishing how the military would defend areas of strategic importance or use 
offensive means to defeat rival powers in the area. War Plan Orange outlined U.S. military 
defense of the Pacific region against a rising Japanese threat. The Plan called for building a 
triangle of defensive bases in Panama, Hawaii, and Alaska, and Congress allocated funding to 
the military to build bases in these locations. However, Alaska remained at the bottom of the 
priority list, with Congress failing to recognize the wisdom in Mitchell’s warning that a U.S. 
defense against Japan depended greatly on Alaska.38 Although some state and federal lawmakers 
and military leadership asked for defense expenditures for Alaska, limited funds arrived; these 
went to the development of a military cold weather testing site in Fairbanks, named Ladd Field. 
The military chose Fairbanks because of its subarctic climate. It provided the best location to test
36 Ernest Gruening, The State o f Alaska (New York, NY: Random House Inc., 1968), 297.
37 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 30.
38 Ibid., 31.
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and train in such extreme temperatures. Prior to this new cold weather test facility in Alaska, the 
Air Corps tested all its equipment in a lab in Florida. The cold weather test site also provided a 
location for all types of military units to train for cold weather operations.39 The cold weather 
site at Ladd Field and the small unit in Haines were the only manned military sites in Alaska 
when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, instigating World War II.
While Alaska appears remote from Germany when traveling east or westward, if  one 
considers a direct route over the North Pole, that distance shrinks considerably.40 Congress 
suddenly recognized the wisdom of Mitchell’s words and the importance of Alaska’s 
geostrategic position; quite feasibly an airplane could fly over the pole and attack North 
America. Therefore, in 1940, Congress provided funding to the U.S. military to improve 
Alaska’s defenses.41 The battle for Alaska’s defense had not yet been won, however.
Dimond had swayed General George Marshall, then Chief of Staff of the Army, to 
request a large Army budget that included a new base in Anchorage. As Congress reviewed the 
defense budget, however, leaders cut the request by nearly ten percent and removed the 
allocation for the new base in Alaska. Dimond told Congress this cut would lead to the 
annihilation of Alaska and inevitably that of the United States. Meanwhile, Marshall continued 
to lobby Congress to reinstate the full budget request. Due to considerable lobbying, Congress 
restored the funds to Alaska.42
In the pre-World War II years, rumors circulated throughout Washington that the Soviets 
planned to attack Alaska soon. These unfounded rumors could have influenced Congress to 
approve the Army’s full budget request. Nevertheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reduced
39 Kathy Price, The World War II Heritage o f  Ladd Field, Fairbanks, A K  (Ft. Collins, CO: Center for Environmental 
Management of Military Lands, Colorado State University, 2004), 5.
40 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 45.
41 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 45.
42 Ibid.
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the budget once again on the grounds that he did not want the American people to fear 
government plans to engage the U.S. military in foreign wars, when no official declaration of 
war had been made. This action by the President put the construction of Fort Richardson on 
hold.43
2.3 World War II to Pre-Cold War (1940-1949)
In May 1940, Germany invaded France, and the attitude in Washington changed 
dramatically. In fact, instead of the original $15 billion the Army originally requested for its 
defense budget, Congress allocated $28 billion.44 Although military expenditures improved 
infrastructure in Alaska, the enhancements remained minimal since at the time the United States 
did not feel threatened in the Pacific.45 General Simon Buckner oversaw the infrastructure 
buildup in Alaska, focusing on building bases in Southeast Alaska and Southcentral Alaska. 
Prior to his assignment in Alaska, General Buckner only held military assignments that focused 
on training. He had not seen any combat during World War I. However, according to Lyman 
Woodman, General Dewitt, the future commander of the Western Defense Command, selected 
Buckner to build up the defense of Alaska, because of his ability to foresee and overcome 
problems.46
Across the world from Europe tensions began to brew with the rising power in the 
Pacific, the Japanese Empire. During World War I, Japan had begun an expansion campaign 
throughout Asia. Japan set out to create the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under 
Japanese dominance. This goal began during World War I and continued during the interwar
43 Ibid, 44.
44 Ibid. Early in 1941, the national defense budget authorized the Pentagon an additional $108 billion, so in the 
matter of four months the defense budget reached $135 billion.
45 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 69.
46 Ibid.
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years and even into World War II. Japan started this campaign by capturing resource-rich 
territories in China. After many years of brutal fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese, 
the United States threatened Japan with cutting off imports if it did not halt its aggression and 
leave China. Refusing to relinquish the territory it had conquered, Japan rejected the United 
States’ demand. This led the United States to cut off the flow of resources that Japan relied on to 
prosecute its aims in China. Japan thus turned its attention of Southeast Asia and the East Indies 
to fulfill its resource needs.47
The alignment of German, Italian, and Japanese strategic aims with the formation of the 
Axis powers meant that Hitler endorsed Japanese goals of dominating East Asia. Germany and 
Japan relied on one another as trading partners as they propagated their goals in their respective 
regions, with the ultimate vision of jointly controlling most of the world.48 Japan’s aims in the 
Pacific would draw the United States into the war.
Japan’s December 7, 1941 attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base in Hawaii awakened 
Americans to the threat in the Pacific, and led to an American declaration of war against Japan 
and against Germany. The threat in the Pacific in particular led to Congressional allocations to 
enhance defensive capabilities in Alaska. Clearly the Aleutians provided the closest launching 
point for an attack on the Japanese homeland if the need ever arose.49 American commitments to 
our Allies in Europe limited the number of troops that could be stationed in Alaska. Governor 
Ernest Gruening and Delegate Dimond continued to pressure Congress to provide more defenses 
to Alaska to protect the United States.
47 Charles Viale, “Prelude to War: Japan’s Goals and Strategies in World War II” (master’s thesis, United States 
Army Command and Staff College, 1988).
48 Ibid.
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Japan’s strategic aims in the Pacific led to attacks at Dutch Harbor, Alaska and on the 
Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska. On June 4, and again on June 5, 1942, Japan bombed Dutch 
Harbor, causing only minimal damage to the base located there. Two days later, Japan invaded 
and captured the islands of Attu and Kiska.50 Japan planned the Aleutian Islands attack as a 
diversion from its primary target of Midway Island. It sought to control the North Pacific and 
extend its defensive perimeter nearly two thousand miles from the Japanese homeland, thereby 
strengthening the empire’s comprehensive defensive capacities. Although Japan lost the 
concurrent battle of Midway, a defeat that would be a turning point in the war in the Pacific, it 
secured a victory in Alaska. It had attacked a major airbase and captured U.S. soil, a stunning 
accomplishment unmatched in over one hundred years, not since the English captured Detroit in 
the War of 1812. Japan used this victory in Alaska as a morale booster for the people of Japan, 
especially as its defeats in the Pacific continued.51
Many U.S. leaders feared Japan would use the Aleutians as stepping stones to invade 
Canada and the West Coast of the United States. Over the next fifteen months, the United States 
therefore steadily increased the size of the military presence in Alaska. The U.S. Army Air 
Corps52 bombed Japanese forces in the Aleutian Islands, and prepared for U.S. forces to 
recapture the islands in the summer of 1943. Just prior to the recapture of Attu and Kiska, the 
military force strength in Alaska reached over 150,000 troops. These numbers made Alaska one 
of the largest theaters of operation during World War II. The American people feared that Japan
50 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 178.
51 Hisashi Takahashi, “The Japanese Campaign in Alaska as Seen from the Strategic Perspective,” in Alaska at War 
1941-1945: The Forgotten War Remembered, ed. Fern Chandonnet (Fairbanks, AK: University of Alaska Press, 
2008), 33-38; Samuel Eliot Morison, “The Aleutians,” in History o f  United States Naval Operations in World War 
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1962), 175.
52 U.S. Army Air Corps was the predecessor to the U. S. Air Force until it became its own branch of the military in 
1947.
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would continue its invasion of the United States, and they simply could not allow the Japanese to 
control U.S. mainland soil.53 Along with increasing the number of troops deployed to Alaska, the 
Pentagon also built additional bases in the Aleutians to support the war effort and recapture the 
two Japanese-occupied islands. The U.S. Army built bases at Adak, Amchitka, Atka, and Umnak 
which the Army Air Corps used throughout the war to keep pressure on the Japanese. The Navy 
would continue to use Adak Island as a base for operations during the Cold War.
The battle to recapture Attu in May 1943 entailed nineteen days of brutal hand to hand 
combat, resulting in the Japanese losing a total of 2,351 men and the Americans suffering a loss 
of 549 and 1,148 wounded personnel. Following the victory on Attu, the U.S. military had to 
liberate the remainder of the Aleutians. U.S. forces immediately began the preparations to retake 
Kiska from the Japanese. When massive allied forces landed at Kiska in August, prepared to 
retake the island, they found it deserted, the Japanese having evacuated in late July, owing to the 
defeat at Attu. After landing, the U.S. contingent proceeded to the Japanese main camp and saw 
signs of a massive evacuation. Though no Japanese forces occupied the island, the U.S. forces 
suffered casualties through friendly fire. This was the end of the Aleutian Campaign with the 
United States emerging victorious.54
With the Japanese removed from western Alaska, the United States recovered Japan’s 
staging area in the Aleutians. The threat of a Japanese invasion of Canada and the United States 
thus subsided.55 Demand for U.S. troops in other locations throughout the world was growing 
steadily, however, causing troop numbers in Alaska decreased slightly. Around 100,000 troops 
remained in Alaska fulfilling various functions, including the continued bombing of Japanese
53 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 186.
54 Ibid.
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bases closer to Tokyo from bases in the Aleutians. Furthermore, military leaders held firm to the 
idea that troops from Alaska could attack the heart of the Japanese Empire in Tokyo directly. 
Additionally, the presence of substantial troop numbers in Alaska maintained pressure on Japan, 
effectively deterring further aggression on the North American continent. Military leaders 
wanted Japan to fear a possible U.S. invasion from the Aleutians. The threat of a U.S. invasion 
kept Japan on the defensive in the North Pacific, ruling out Japan’s deployment of additional 
soldiers elsewhere in the Pacific. Lastly, U.S. troops remained in Alaska to assist with the Lend- 
Lease program, which assisted the Soviet Union in its efforts to defeat German forces. The 
number of U.S. troops in Alaska continued to drop during the latter part of the war, reaching
60,000 by the time Japan surrendered in 1945.56
The U.S. military concentrated its troops in South Central Alaska and along the Aleutian 
Island chain during World War II, leaving a majority of Alaska open to possible Japanese 
invasion. The Alaska Territorial Guard (ATG) stepped up to defend Alaska’s extensive coastline, 
proudly defending their native homeland.57 Early in the war Army Major Marvin “Muktuk” 
Martson had the idea to form a unit of Alaska Natives, who knew the territory, to act as 
“lookouts or scouts along [the] 5000 miles of irregular Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean coastline 
and up the many meandering rivers.” In building the case for their suitability for this mission, 
Marston noted Alaska Natives’ “greater familiarity (with) all of Alaska’s isolated sections; the 
necessity of indoctrinating and warning our natives; their adaptability as eyes and ears for our 
intelligence department; and their invaluable aid to our airmen in case of crash or forced 
landing.”58
56 Garfield, Thousand-Mile War, 411; Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 1-8.
57 The Alaska Territorial Guard was also called the Tundra Army and the Eskimo Scouts.
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After convincing Buckner of his plan to use Alaska Natives to protect the remainder of 
Alaska, Marston began his expedition around Alaska to enlist Natives for this duty. Gruening 
accompanied Marston during the beginning of the recruiting campaign. They had almost no 
trouble at any of the towns and villages they visited and enrolled nearly 100 percent of men 
asked. In some villages, the teachers and missionaries opposed the militarization of Alaska 
Natives, causing some not to join the war cause. By early 1943 over 4,200 Alaska Natives had 
joined the ATG. Marston armed all these men with World War I era rifles, a welcome upgrade to 
the guns many of the men owned. For the remainder of the war, the ATG continued to scout the 
Western Coast of Alaska for an enemy that never appeared.
However, the ATG provided another service that may have saved lives during World War 
II. Around 1942, the Japanese developed a strategy to bomb the United States using high-altitude 
balloons, sending them through the Pacific jet stream with the hopes of causing wild fires in 
Alaska and the Northwest United States. Of the almost six thousand balloons they launched, only 
about four hundred reached the United States, and they had no damaging effects. Of those four 
hundred or so balloons the ATG only spotted thirty-six over Alaska and followed them to 
prevent any damage. The ATG also discovered even more balloon debris on its scouting 
expeditions, which was used to gather valuable intelligence on the Japanese balloon campaign.59 
The Alaska Territorial Guard was disbanded in 1947.
After World War II, U.S. troop strength fell considerably, especially in Alaska. In the two 
years after the war, troop numbers in Alaska dropped from around sixty thousand to 
approximately nineteen thousand. The U.S. government initially believed the post-WWII period 
would be peaceful, reducing the need for large numbers of active servicemen.60 The nineteen
59 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 102-05.
60 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 186.
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thousand troops in Alaska did not represent a fighting force, but rather personnel tasked with 
cleaning up the abandoned bases in Alaska. The U.S. military also reactivated the Cold Weather 
Testing Center at Ladd Field near Fairbanks, which had temporarily closed during the height of 
action in Alaska.61 Although a sharp decrease in troops occurred during this post-war time, many 
politicians in Washington believed Alaska retained strategic importance.
After World War II the U.S. military received a broad redesign. During World War II 
only two branches of service existed -  the Army and the Navy. Many leaders in Washington 
believed the divide between the services hurt the overall war effort. This led to the passing of the 
National Security Act of 1947, which created the Joint Chiefs of Staff’ s office. In this new office 
one General or Admiral from any service would be appointed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), which would oversee all military matters for the United States. The act also 
separated the Army Air Corps and created the Air Force.
The first Chairman of the JCS, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, recommended to the 
President that all overseas commands (Alaska is considered overseas for military planning) be 
consolidated into unified commands with one commanding officer. The President agreed and 
five joint commands were created: the Far East, Pacific, Northeast, Europe, and Alaska. The 
Alaska Command became the first operational joint command. With these new joint commands, 
the commander would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This new configuration 
benefited Alaska significantly, since the new commanding officer, General Craig, had a direct 
link to Leahy, and had a better chance to influence defense spending and allocation of federal 
funds. This new arrangement presented an improvement over World War II protocols, when 
General Buckner had to negotiate with his superior officer, General Dewitt, who in turn had to
61 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 29-36.
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lobby his higher commander, General Marshall, to request additional defense spending for 
Alaska, and the various levels of authority differed in their priorities.62
By this time, the U.S. government perceived the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to 
national security. And clearly the route for a potential attack was over the pole. Part of the new 
Alaska Command’s mission statement read, “this vast land lay astride the Great Circle Route and 
could serve as an effective buffer zone, if adequately defended, against any potential aggressor 
seeking to exploit the shorter global distance to America’s heartland.”63 The United States would 
not allow itself to be caught unprepared again, as it had been in December 1941.
2.4 The Cold War (1950-1990)
Anthony Dimond’s protege, Bob Bartlett, became Alaska’s Delegate to the U.S.
Congress in 1945. Bartlett continued in Dimond’s footsteps, working tirelessly to advocate for 
increased national defense in Alaska. Additionally, Ernest Gruening, the Governor of Alaska, 
continued to advocate for Alaska’s strategic significance leading up to the Cold War and until 
the time he left office in 1953. Moreover, members of the Senate Military Defense Preparedness 
Subcommittee visited Alaska in October 1950 and reported to Congress their position that 
Alaska remained important for the continued defense of the United States.64
In the post-World War II years, tensions mounted between the USSR and the United 
States, as Stalin exerted control in East Europe. During World War II, the Soviet Union had 
liberated Eastern Europe from Germany; it maintained forces there to create a buffer zone 
against another potential invasion by Germany. Western Europe and the United States viewed
62 Ibid., 50.
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the Soviet Union’s expansionism as evidence of a Marxist-Leninist strategy to spread 
communism throughout the world. Winston Churchill referred to the Soviet Union’s rising 
control over East Europe as an “iron curtain descending] over the continent.”65 Churchill’s Iron 
Curtain speech referred to the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain 
and suggested that as great powers these two countries carried the responsibility to organize and 
police the postwar world. This close relationship with Great Britain and other western European 
countries led the United States to develop a program to assist in the rebuilding of Europe, called 
the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union interpreted the Marshall Plan as an effort to interfere in the 
internal affairs of other states. Moreover, it viewed the strengthening of western European states 
as a threat to its security. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and forced 
the eastern European countries within its sphere to reject this offer of help to rebuild their 
economies and democratic institutions.66
Meanwhile, during the postwar years, the Soviet Union also increased its military 
activities in Siberia, alarming many in the United States. Owing to advancements in Soviet 
aircraft technology, a Soviet bomber could fly from Siberia and bomb the state of Washington 
before returning to Siberia, without the need to land and refuel. This led to the creation of the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, a series of radar stations, in Alaska and across Northern 
Canada.67 This technology brought an increase of military personnel to build and run the many 
radar stations built in Alaska.
Early in the Cold War the primary Soviet threat lay in its capacity to drop a nuclear bomb 
(that it had developed in 1949), delivered by a long-range bomber. The DEW line offered
65 Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtin Speech),” (speech, Westminter College, Fulton, MO, March 5, 
1946), https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html.
66 Peter Boyle, American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall o f Communism (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1993), 54-70.
67 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 203.
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protection against such potential air raids by providing early warning of approaching aircraft. 
Although scientists warned against the need for the DEW line because of the impending advent 
of the ballistic missile, President Eisenhower approved the construction of the DEW line from 
western Alaska through Canada to the east coast of Greenland. The line consisted of sixty-one 
sites located about fifty miles apart, sixteen originally situated in Alaska, located on high 
elevation. Placing the stations on top of hills and mountains maximized the accuracy of the radar 
systems. Two years after the first phase was completed in 1947, the government built six 
additional sites along the Aleutian Islands chain. The U.S. government spent over $600 million 
on the completion of the DEW line. This project created construction jobs for many Alaskans 
because each station located on hill tops or mountains required an access road and each site 
consisted of facilities that created self-sufficient little cities. Communication between the long 
line of DEW line sites and the command center, the North American Air Defense (NORAD) 
Headquarters that would control the new defensive belt, posed challenges, so the military 
developed an “over the horizon radio” code named White Alice. This new communication 
system let each site talk directly to NORAD to report any incoming enemy aircraft.68
Scientists’ warnings that the DEW line would become obsolete before it was completed 
came true, as during the 1950s, the Soviet Union had perfected its intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) technology. This required the United States to construct a different system to 
detect these ICBMs, because the DEW line did not have the capabilities to monitor for missiles. 
Consequently, the US developed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). This 
new system brought with it the creation of a new Air Force base located south of Fairbanks, 
named Clear Air Force base.69
68 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 106-08; Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 206-08.
69Ibid., 208-209.
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During the late 1940s tensions started to brew anew in the Pacific, between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, owing to the fear of the rise and spread of communism. This strain 
between the United States and Soviet Union began on the divided Korean peninsula. The Soviet 
Union and the United States divided the peninsula at the 38th parallel after liberating Korea from 
Japanese control at the close of World War II. Each occupying force oversaw the installation of a 
government aligned with the occupying force. As they had agreed, Soviet forces withdrew from 
North Korea in 1948, and U.S. forces withdrew from South Korea in 1949. The North Korean 
government decided in 1950 that it would attempt to conquer the rest of the Korean peninsula, so 
with the support of the Soviet Union, the North Korean People’s Army invaded across the 38th 
parallel and quickly captured Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Shortly after the invasion, the 
U.N. Security Council approved a U.S.-lead U.N. force to assist the South Koreans and prevent 
the complete takeover of the country. This force pushed the North Korean Army past the 38th 
parallel, almost to the border of China. Fearing that the United States would not stop at the 
border, China supported North Korea in its recapture of territory to the 38th parallel.70 To the 
United States, the Korean War became much more than about protecting South Korea from a 
hostile force. The war illustrated the Domino Theory, a belief that once a region comes under the 
influence of communism, the surrounding countries would follow and eventually threaten the 
United States directly.71 The Korean War also brought Alaska to the forefront once again due to 
its proximity to the front lines of the conflict against communism.
The events of World War II in the Pacific had demonstrated Alaska’s strategic location in 
the region. Now the U.S. government determined that the number of troops in Alaska must rise
70 Allan Millett, “Korean War: 1950-1953,” in Encyclopedia Britanica, Updated September 27, 2017. 
https ://www.britannica. com/event/Korean-War.
71 Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 
(1980): 573.
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once again.72 The table below shows this rise at the beginning of the Cold War and the sharp 
surge at the outset of the Korean War. With the cease fire in Korea in 1953, troop numbers began 
to decline nationwide. However, in Alaska, troop numbers did not decrease until 1957 when 
offensive and defensive technology became increasingly important during the Cold War. Alaska 
would see a steady decrease in military personnel levels until 1973, owing to this increased 
reliance on technology over manpower. Starting in 1973, troop strength remained relatively 
consistent, as the United States reached a stable technology-to-soldier ratio. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, another slight decrease occurred in 
Alaska, bringing troop numbers to the current level that has remained relatively stable (see 
Figure 2.3 below).
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Figure 2.3: Military Personnel in Alaska, 1946-2017. This figure provides a better visual representation of military 
personnel in Alaska after World War II because it does not show the drastic increase of personnel during World War
II.73
72 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 190-91.
73 Infonnation in figure comes from Hmmnel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; U.S. Census Bureau, 
“Consolidated Federal Funds Reports.”
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During the early years of the Cold War, U.S. military leaders continued to believe a 
potential Soviet attack or invasion of the United States could occur over the pole and through 
Alaska. This mindset changed to believing in the possible threat of a nuclear missile strike on 
large population centers in the United States. Leaders in Alaska, including Governor William 
Egan (1959-1966 and 1970-1974), believed that the Soviet Union with “one or two well placed 
warheads or bombs would ... easily wipe out Alaskan defenses, allowing Russia to occupy the 
territory.”74 This possibility required a fighting force to remain in Alaska and train in Arctic 
conditions to deter any possible attack on Alaska. Starting in the 1950s and throughout the Cold 
War, the military conducted its largest training exercises in Alaska. Twice a year, during the 
summer and winter, thousands of military troops would come and participate in exercises to 
prepare for fighting in the Arctic to defend Alaska. Intelligence officers provided classes on 
Soviet military strategy, tactics, and practices to better prepare the U.S. military for unfamiliar 
foes. During training exercises, Special Forces soldiers dressed in Soviet uniforms role played as 
enemy forces engaging U.S. troops.75
During the Cold War, U.S. troop strength in Alaska reached a maximum of fifty thousand 
in order to preposition soldiers to defend against the perceived threat of communism in East 
Asia. During this time, the U.S. military’s primary mission included training and preparing to 
defend Alaska in the event of an invasion. Although technology advanced greatly during this 
time, many leaders still believed “boots on the ground” would remain necessary to defend 
Alaska and the United States.76 During the Cold War, nuclear delivery capabilities evolved from 
aircraft to ballistic missiles. Throughout the era, Alaska’s leadership stressed that Alaska 
remained the best location for front line detection and deterrence of the Soviet threat.
74 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 195.
75 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 93-99.
76 Hummel, “The U.S. Military as Geographical Agent,” 47.
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Meanwhile, many military leaders, including President Eisenhower, believed that the future of 
warfare lay in technological advancements, rather than ground troops. By 1958, troop strength in 
Alaska dropped from its height of fifty thousand to approximately thirty thousand. This number 
would continue to drop over the course of the Cold War to the current strength of around twenty 
thousand.77 Although a reduction in troop numbers took place, defense spending grew during this 
time, owing primarily to the stationing of defensive radar and missile sites.
Meanwhile, in 1959, Alaska had entered the Union as the 49th state. Statehood gave 
Alaska’s Congressional delegation the same powers as those of every other state. Alaska’s 
Congressional delegation could now vote on federal legislation.
2.5 Post-Cold War Era (1991-Current)
In the post-Cold War period, uncertainties surrounding Alaska’s strategic importance 
have arisen, given the elusiveness and multiplicity of threats to U.S. security. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, Alaska’s proximity to Russia lost much of its significance. Naske 
points out that “[t]he rationale that drove military activities in the Arctic ... virtually 
disappeared.”78 Starting in 1988, the Pentagon conducted a Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) program, aiming to achieve a “peace dividend” now that the Cold War had ended. The 
study concluded with a proposal to cut over 300,000 personnel and close many bases throughout 
the United States.79 The Pentagon did not spare Alaska from these proposed personnel cuts and 
base closures, when it closed two of the four major base: Adak Naval station and Fort Greely.
77 Ibid., 49.
78 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 214.
79 Ibid., 215.
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In the Aleutians, the military had continued to use some bases after U.S. forces 
recaptured Attu and Kiska during World War II. The Air Force used the base on Adak until the 
1950s when it became the property of the U.S. Navy. The Navy used the Adak base throughout 
the Cold War, but then in 1995 it appeared on the list of closures produced by the BRAC 
commission. Consequently, the naval base on Adak, the only permanent Naval presence in 
Alaska, ceased all operations in 1997.80 The U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet currently has minimal 
presence in the Arctic; training missions occur mostly during the summer months in the Gulf of 
Alaska and the Bering Sea. The Navy’s submarine fleet has also used the Arctic to traverse 
between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, but the Navy needs more ice hardened ships to have a 
more active role in the Arctic.81
BRAC called for a reduction in personnel and operations at Fort Greely, near Delta 
Junction. Only the Cold Weather Testing center and other minor operations were to remain.
Delta Junction and the State of Alaska were to acquire the remainder of the military base and 
surrounding land. The plan changed, however, in 2002 when the United States withdrew from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty it had signed with the USSR in 1972. Fort Greely then became 
the site for the U.S. military’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, leading to the 
construction of approximately thirty anti-ballistic missile underground silos at Fort Greely. This 
system can monitor and protect up to a fifteen-time zone span fanning out from Alaska. The only 
parts of the world the system does not protect are Europe and Africa. The GMD monitors for any 
potential ballistic missile threat, and upon notification of an incoming ballistic missile, this 
system can deploy an anti-ballistic missile, which will intercept the missile threat in space. In
80 “Former Naval Air Facility Adak,” Naval Facilities Engineering Command, U.S. Navy, accessed January 7, 2018, 
https://www.bracpmo.navy.mil/brac_bases/other_west/former_naf_adak.html.
81 David Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap”, 
in Arctic Security in an Age o f Climate Change, ed. James Kraska (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 274-75.
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2013, the Obama Administration extended this program, with additional anti-ballistic missiles to 
counter the rising threat of North Korea and its nuclear program.82
In 2014, the Obama Administration announced that it intended to cut 120,000 troops 
from the U.S. Army. As a result, the government would reduce the Army unit at Fort 
Richardson, near Anchorage, to 2,600 troops.83 Only a small Arctic trained Airborne section of 
approximately 400 soldiers would remain at Fort Richardson. Alaska’s Congressional delegation 
fought against the cut for two years, and in early 2017, the Pentagon officially announced that 
this reduction would not take place, and the entire 3,000 soldiers would remain at Fort 
Richardson.84 The Senators’ main arguments to retain the troops in Alaska rested on their 
training in Arctic conditions and Alaska’s proximity to the Asia-Pacific region. Also in 2016, an 
announcement came from the Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah Jones, that a squadron of 54 
F-35 fighter aircraft would call Eielson Air Force Base home. Along with this new Air Force 
platform 3,000 Airmen and contractors will accompany these aircrafts to the base near 
Fairbanks.85 Once again, Alaska’s Senators had stressed Alaska’s strategic location in the Pacific 
and the Arctic to convince lawmakers to place the stealth fighter planes in Alaska.
2.6 Conclusion
From manning trading posts in the district days of Alaska to piloting a squadron of highly 
advanced F-35 fighter planes, the functions, troop strengths, and defense expenditures have 
varied throughout Alaska’s history. At the military’s height in Alaska, the stationing of over
150,000 soldiers in the Territory made it the largest theater of U.S. military operation during
82 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 215; “Elements: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” Missile 
Defense Agency, Department of Defense, updated March 22, 2018, https://www.mda.mil/system/gmd.html.
83 Freedberg, “Army Bases Bleed, Then BRAC Comes.”
84 Martinson, “It’s Official: The Army’s 4-25th Stays at Full Firepower in Alaska.”
85 Martinson, “Air Force OKs F-35 Fighter Jet Squadrons at Eielson Air Force Base.”
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World War II. At the close of the war, Alaska troop placements and expenditures fell. With the 
beginning of the Cold War, once again, troop levels rose, only to decrease about eight years later. 
That decrease in the number of troops reflected increasing reliance on technology, rather than a 
decrease in Cold War tensions. Increasing use of technology led to troop numbers stabilizing in 
Alaska, even as defense spending fluctuated. Analysis of the three historical periods -  World 
War II, the early Cold War era and post-Cold War -  which show significant variations in 
military capabilities and strength, can shed light on the events and forces underlying the 
fluctuations in military strength in Alaska. Such knowledge can inform future decisions 
regarding defensive capabilities and military strength in Alaska.
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This thesis explains how international and domestic factors influence the increase and 
decrease of military strength in Alaska. It employs two theories, structural realism and the 
advocacy coalition framework, to analyze the military’s buildup and reduction in Alaska during 
World War II (1940-1945) and during the early years of the Cold War (1950-1958) and the steep 
drop in military expenditures during the post-Cold War era (1993-1999). Structural realism 
theory emphasizes a state’s pursuit of self-interests in the international system and how self­
interest determines how it will decide to respond when threatened. At the domestic level, the 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) spotlights the formation of groups advocating for specific 
policies and how these coalitions attempt to influence policy makers and the public to achieve 
their objectives. This chapter examines both structural realism theory and the ACF and describes 
how each theory assists in the analysis of military expenditures in Alaska during the three 
identified eras. If these theories have strong explanatory power, the narratives of military 
influxes in Alaska should correspond to them. This chapter then discusses the data collection 
process, the method of process-tracing, and the case study approach.
3.2 Realism
Realism in international relations describes how states interact in the international 
system. Owing to the absence of a world government, often expressed by political scientists as 
“anarchy,” realism focuses on state power and interests and remains pessimistic about the extent 
to which states can cooperate in international affairs. Anarchy and egoism in the international 
political system lead states to focus on their own security. Realism also argues that fear, honor,
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and interests drive a state’s behavior.1 Subgroups in the realist camp emphasize different aspects 
of how a country will act in the international arena; these include classical realism and structural 
realism (also called neorealism).2
Classical realism focuses on human nature and argues that humans have a natural instinct 
to want to dominate others. Classical realism, whose roots date back to ancient Greece when 
Thucydides explained that the main features of the world are power and interests in his History 
o f the Peloponnesian War.3 Thucydides went on to say that human nature drives individuals to 
rule wherever they can.4 Niccolo Machiavelli, writing in the early sixteenth century, argued that 
human nature drives leaders to want to stay in power, and that the ruler should do whatever 
necessary to keep that power.5 Machiavelli also explained that the paramount concerns for all 
individuals living in the world are power and security.6 Hans Morgenthau, writing in the early 
1970s, viewed states as unitary actors that act in rational and self-interested ways. According to 
Morgenthau, states strive to dominate others, often leading to wars and conflict.7 He also 
maintained that states are controlled by leaders driven by human nature and the need to gain 
more power, and that human nature can cause conflict.8
Kenneth Waltz, one of the founders of structural realism, believed classical realism 
needed more scientific qualities and elements that could be tested. In the late 1970s and the 
1980s, he developed a realism theory that generated predictions which were testable with the
1 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19 - 43.
2 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring, 1998): 
31.
3 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 23.
4 Hans Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power,” (New York, NY: Knopf, 1973), 
40.
5 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Wayne Rebhorn. (New York, NY: Fine Creative Medis Inc., 2003), 62.
6 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 25.
7 Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power,” 4.
8 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 15-16.
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possibility of being replicated in multiple cases within international politics.9 Structural realism 
focuses on how anarchy and the current international power structure influences state behavior in 
the international system.10 Anarchy stresses how the lack of a world government leads states to 
protect themselves in a self-help world. Waltz presents four underlying assumptions for 
structural realism theory. First, states act in response to threats to their interests. If a country’s 
interests become threatened, then it will act to preserve that interest. One such interest is national 
security; when a state feels its security is threatened, it will act to protect that security. Second, 
these policies or actions are formed in response to competition among states, given that in a state 
of anarchy, no central power exists to control power struggles among states. States therefore 
must develop policies that prevent other states from encroaching on their sovereignty. Third, 
states are rational actors and will pick the most logical foreign policy. This implies that a country 
will consider the costs versus the benefits in choosing the best course of action. A country will 
try to position its assets in locations that add to its power and provides the best security. Finally, 
policy success is evident when a country maintains its power in the world and bolsters its 
security.11
Structural realism theory dominated international relations discourse during the Cold War 
because this theory provided the best observable explanations for war, imperialism, alliances, 
deterrence and obstacles to cooperation. Structural realism also applies to various aspects of the 
lead up to World War II and the course of the war. It explains that prior to World War II, a 
multipolar power structure existed in the world. That is, power was distributed among several 
states. The great world powers during this time consisted of Great Britain, France, Russia,
9 Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism,” 
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June, 1995): 141-42.
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1979), 88-99; Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 11.
11 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 117.
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Austria-Hungry, Germany and the United States. This multipolar era ended during World War II, 
and a bipolar world emerged during the Cold War with the rise of the United States and the 
Soviet Union as the only superpowers in the world.
When two superpowers dominate the world, bipolarity characterizes the international 
order. The bipolar world occurred after the Axis powers’ defeat and the Soviet Union moved into 
the power vacuum created in Europe, establishing dominance where none existed. U.S. power 
had grown substantially during World War II to rival any country in the world. Thus, the United 
States and the Soviet Union emerged as the most powerful countries in the world. The stark 
differences in their political principles and views on the international order created strong 
tension.12 In a bipolar world, a state must match its defensive capabilities with the only other 
superpower or risk that country becoming the dominant power. In the two-power competition, 
neither country questioned who endangered whom. Structural realism’s emphasis on conflict and 
competition elucidated the central features of the Soviet-American rivalry, by explaining that 
either nation’s loss in a conflict, for instance in Vietnam, could provide a relative gain in power 
for the other nation.13 Waltz explains that states seek relative gains, which expresses that when 
one country gains power or territory the other state loses power.14 Thus, the stakes were high in 
proxy wars such as the Vietnam conflict. Structural realists believe that unbalanced power makes 
weaker states nervous and motivates them to become stronger, even if the dominant power 
remains a friendly ally. Given the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, each
12 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 
1 (1990): 22.
13 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 31.
14 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 22.
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was compelled to maintain its strength and to strive for an advantage over the other. Structural 
realists hold that survival stands as the ultimate goal, and power represents a means to that end.15
A unipolar world occurs when only one state holds power in the world.16 In a unipolar 
world, the state that holds the most power can determine the size of its military, provided it 
maintains the status quo. Structural realist theory states that a unipolar world appears as the least 
stable configuration of the international realm and that the structure will seek to return to a state 
of balanced powers. When one nation becomes the dominant power, weaker states will begin to 
fear the dominant power and suspect the motives in its actions. When a balance of power does 
not exist, as in a unipolar world, countries will start to increase their own strength or ally 
(bandwagon)17 with other states to try and balance the power once again.18 Currently, China and 
Russia have become closer allies in response to the perception that the United States will 
continue to gain power; thus, they endeavor to bring the world back to a power balance. In sum, 
the international power structure at any given time will determine countries’ courses of action 
regarding their military capabilities.
Structural realism theorists differ when assessing how much power a country will strive 
to have, and whether power can be measured by the size and funding a country provides its 
military. This divide shapes defensive and offensive realism. Defensive realism posits that 
stronger states can pursue moderate strategies and exercise restraint in their national defense 
policies, to dissuade another country from increasing its own military. 19 States only need to
15 John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. 
Timothy Dune, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 72.
16 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 31; Barry R. Posen, “Emerging Multipolarity: Why 
Should We Care?,” Current History 108, no. 721 (2009): 352.
17 Bandwagoning is when countries join together for protection from a growing or potential threat.
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000): 27­
28.
19 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, 
no. 3. (Winter, 2000-2001): 129.
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achieve an “appropriate amount of power,” and exceeding that level would risk other countries 
feeling threatened and drive them to increase their military expenditures to increase their 
security.20 When a country attempts to gain power too quickly, the rest of the world will seek to 
balance this power by building coalitions to counter the rising power. In sum, a state can risk its 
own survival by increasing its defensive forces too quickly, because this could incite a 
perception of threat and cause other countries to ally together to defeat the growing power. To 
mitigate this, a country can decrease the size of its military to a reasonable level, while remaining 
secure, due to the fact that other countries limit their military forces as well. Defensive realism 
also points out that in the “absence of an immediate threat ... [states] will have more difficulty in 
mobilizing domestic resources for foreign policy.”21 When a country’s citizens feel secure, 
believing that their country holds sufficient power, they will not feel the need for an ever- 
increasing military. Furthermore, when no threat exists, policy makers will not feel compelled to 
increase the country’s military forces. Moreover, nuclear deterrence impacts defensive realism 
because international conflicts no longer represent a test of conventional capabilities, so 
countries do not need large conventional military forces to deter a potential threat. States with 
even a small nuclear arsenal can stand up to a dominant power because of the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons and the possibility of mutually assured destruction.22 This means a 
country can decrease its military force, while continuing to maintain power and security.
In contrast to defensive realism, John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism maintains that 
states will strive to gain as much power as possible. This overwhelming power provides the best 
means to ensure the survival of a state. States can never know the intentions of others and will 
always remain ready to defend against any potential threat. Mearsheimer argues that countries
20 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” 75.
21 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” 142.
22 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 20.
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will tend to arm themselves beyond their defensive needs, increasing their offensive capacities, 
and suggests that countries rarely will decrease their military capabilities. States will always 
continue to build their military capabilities in order to expand their power and defend against any 
unseen threat. Mearsheimer explains that this need to gain power is not for domination or 
conquest, rather it represents the best way to guarantee survival and that embodies the ultimate 
goal for all nations.23 Given the decreases in military strength at various times throughout U.S. 
history, including during the eras studied here, this thesis will not utilize offensive realism 
because it emphasizes the need to increase military capabilities either for security or to gain 
power. Conversely, defensive realism stresses that counties need to achieve an appropriate 
amount of power to ensure the security that all countries seek. Defensive realism also accounts 
for nuclear weapons and the need to not have large numbers of troops to achieve the desired 
level of power and security.
This thesis employs structural realism because it can explain why a country chooses 
certain national defense policies, such as increasing or decreasing its military power and defense 
spending in a geographic location. It argues that when a country feels threatened, it will increase 
its defenses. Correspondingly, when a country eliminates a threat, or the threat subsides, it will 
no longer feel the need to maintain a strong military for deterrence reasons, which defensive 
realism highlights. The United States maintains the strongest military in the world, but once a 
major threat no longer exists, the United States tends to decrease its military expenditures to a 
minimal level of security in accordance with the current threat level. Structural realism thus can 
explain why, where, and to what degree a country builds its military strength. When a state feels 
threatened by the potential loss of territory or power in a specific region, it will act to protect its
23 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” 72.
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interests in that region. Analyzing the action a country has taken during specific situations can 
help predict what policy that country would implement if  a similar situation arose again.
This thesis investigates whether the U.S. government’s decisions to increase and decrease 
military power in Alaska aligns with the tenets of realism theory. If this theory has high 
explanatory power, then a country will respond with an increase in national defense when it feels 
threatened. Likewise, when the threat subsides, the country will try to achieve the appropriate 
level of strength, which could mean decreasing the size of a country’s military capabilities.
3.3 Advocacy Coalition Framework
The ACF “is a lens to understand and explain belief and policy change ... involving 
multiple actors from several levels of government, interest groups, research institutions, and the 
media,” as Christopher Weible and Paul Sabatier explain.24 This framework utilizes three main 
premises to explain how a coalition can influence policy change. First, the framework requires a 
study period of a decade or more, to understand the process of policy change.25 With this 
extended length of time, one can see the success or failure of the coalition to influence policy and 
appreciate the variety of strategies the actors pursued over time. The relationships and the actors 
within the coalition could change during this time, but activity to influence policy change must 
continue if the framework is to be viable. This thesis evaluates three separate time periods, for a 
total of over fifty years of national defense policy in Alaska.
Second, ACF focuses on a policy subsystem. A policy subsystem incorporates the players 
actively concerned with a certain issue or policy who energetically work to influence the issue or
24 Weible and Sabatier, “A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 123.
25 Paul A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” Journal o f 
European Public Policy 5., no. 1 (March, 1998): 102.
46
policy. The actors involved include individuals from both the public and private sectors, such as 
lawmakers, researchers, interest groups, the media, and community leaders. A subsystem can 
contain a single coalition or multiple coalitions working toward their own ends to cause policy 
changes. A coalition includes all the individuals who work towards a common goal, in this case, 
those trying to increase national defense for the benefit of Alaska. A coalition will form when the 
individuals who share the same ideas recognize that a policy change is needed. The players in a 
coalition interact with each other to advance their agenda, but do not have to join forces to work 
towards the same goal.26 Advocacy coalitions strive to influence the decisions made by 
government authorities to achieve a certain policy objective.27
Third, the policy subsystem will usually include players from all levels of government. 
Subnational officials have a better understanding of local situations and the policies that will 
provide the most benefit in their jurisdiction. Also, the involvement of actors from a range of 
levels and sectors exposes the policy issues to a wider audience, which in turn allows more 
points of contact to influence policy makers.28
According to ACF, policy change depends in large part on whether a strong advocacy 
coalition is formed. A strong coalition will form when many like-minded individuals, coming 
from different levels of government and private interests, like the media, work together when a 
major need arises. A strong coalition will pool its resources together and use a variety of 
channels of influence to lobby for policy change. A coalition can use persuasive testimony to 
modify lawmakers’ way of thinking and to change public opinion as one approach to influencing
26 Ibid., 107.
27 Ronald Heck, Studying Educational and Social Policy: Theoretical Concepts and Research Methods (Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 120.
28 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, “Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” Journal o f Public 
Policy 14, no. 2 (April -  June, 1994): 178. Heck, Studing Educational and Social Policy, 119; Paul Sabatier and 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment,” in Theories o f  the Policy Process: 
Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy, ed. Paul Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 119.
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policy change. A coalition seeks to alter the current assessment of governmental institutions and 
policy makers to achieve the policy change. Another strategy that a coalition could use is to 
maximize on an external shock, which will be discussed below.29
For a coalition to maintain its influence and continue towards its goal of a policy change, 
it must strive to maintain or even boost its membership; if  it does not do so, it could fail in its 
goal. When a coalition loses participants, its influence will wane, which in turn will hurt its 
prospects for effecting policy change. Coalition members also can shift their focus, which could 
reduce the coalition’s effectiveness in achieving the specific policy goal, as well as more general 
aims. The media plays an important role in coalitions, having the power to persuade the general 
public that a certain policy change is necessary, which can assist a coalition in its efforts to 
influence policy makers. The media can also destabilize a coalition by shifting its focus from the 
policy goal, either because the event has been resolved or because another more pressing event 
captures the media’s attention. Reduced coverage of the issue will diminish public awareness and 
the motivation to continue to pressure lawmakers for a coalition’s intended goal.30
Along with these basic premises, this framework also emphasizes how external shocks 
influence policy change. It explains that external shocks, such as terrorist attacks or oil spills, 
“can pave the way for major change ... [if] skillfully exploited by coalitions ... but events 
themselves are insufficient to generate policy change.”31 To exploit such an event, a coalition 
must seize the moment, mobilize political resources, and rally public opinion, to leverage the 
events to influence policy change. Thomas Birkland, a political scientist who specializes in 
policy change, explains that external shocks or focusing events consist of rare or sudden
29 Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe,” 114-15.
30 Ibid., 115-16.
31 Daniel Nohrstedt, “Shifting Resources and Venues Producing Policy Change in Contested Subsystems: A Case 
Study of Swedish Signals Intelligence Policy,” Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 3 (2011): 463.
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incidents, that cause harm or foreshadow harm to a definable area, and the public and policy 
makers learn about them at the same time.32 Most people do not particularly pay attention to 
external events until they occur and affect their lives directly. When such an event happens and 
directly impacts people’s lives, both the public and policy makers respond to prevent a similar 
disaster from happening again. Conversely, a catastrophic event, like a hurricane, that affects 
only uninhabited areas would not constitute a focusing event that might change policy, because it 
does not directly impact people’s lives. A focusing event does not have to cause direct harm to 
impact policy change, however.33 For instance, when Japan captured two Aleutian Islands in 
Alaska, this foreshadowed the possibility of further invasion of the United States and Canada, 
which caused the United States to act.
Such focusing events can shed light on policy failures and open avenues to provide 
recommendations for policy change. After an external shock occurs, the public and government’s 
awareness of the policy agenda heightens, which leads to increased discussion of the topic. A 
coalition can then steer these discussions towards the intended policy change.34 A coalition could 
use a focusing event to change public opinion in favor of its policy goals, which in turn could 
encourage the public to pressure lawmakers to support the given policy change.
A terrorist attack, for instance, could cause a policy change in intelligence gathering, 
because a coalition would form to argue that the terrorist attack occurred because of a lack of 
intelligence. Following the terrorist attack on September 11, an external shock to the United 
States, a coalition formed to press for an increase in the size of the intelligence community and 
enhancement of its ability to gather information to prevent another attack. This unique event
32 Thomas Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 22.
33 Thomas Birkland, Lessons o f Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2006), 2-3.
34 Albright, “Policy Change and Learning in Response to Extreme Flood Events in Hungary,” 487.
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focused lawmakers’ and the public’s attention on the fact that vulnerabilities existed in U.S. 
homeland security policy.35
This thesis employs the ACF to identify a national defense subsystem focused on 
influencing military policy in Alaska. It will identify the actors involved in the coalition and how 
much power they had to influence policy change to increase defense expenditures in Alaska. 
Additionally, this thesis will examine if small, unfocused advocacy coalitions contributed to 
decreases in troop levels or defense spending in Alaska. Key players who took part in advocating 
for Alaska included congressional lawmakers, military leaders, state leaders, and national news 
sources.
This study utilizes ACF only at the national and subnational levels because it focuses on 
how domestic actors work towards impacting domestic level policy change. International politics 
or events only play into how an advocacy coalition will go about fighting for the intended 
transformation. A majority of the studies have used ACF exclusively for the analysis of national 
policy change.36
To what extent do coalitions impact the national defense policy in Alaska? If this 
framework proves valid, then I should expect to find that when a strong and engaged coalition 
uses any external events that occur during the time period to their benefit, the intended policy 
change will occur. Also, if the coalition remains focused and involved, then I will find that troop 
levels or defense funding increased in Alaska. Additionally, a strong coalition can still achieve 
its goal of policy change even without external events, because these events only add to the 
argument a coalition could already be advancing. External events only provide one tactic to use
35 Birkland, Lessons o f  Disaster, 45.
36 For examples see. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe.”; 
Nohrstedt, “Shifting Resources and Venues Producing Policy Change in Contested Subsystems: A Case Study of 
Swedish Signals Intelligence Policy.”; Birkland, After Disaster.
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for achieving the coalition’s goal. A strong coalition can still utilize many other avenues to 
influence the intended modification.
Conversely, if  a coalition breaks down, then a decrease would most likely occur. A 
breakdown in a coalition can occur if  members are replaced with individuals who do not have the 
same drive or priorities as the previous members. With the new members focused elsewhere, the 
ultimate goal of the prior coalition members will likely not be realized. Alternatively, changes in 
conditions can cause a coalition’s focus to change, or it may disintegrate. If ACF has low 
explanatory power, then the actions of a coalition should have no effect on military power.
3.4 Methodology
This thesis applies structural realism theory and ACF to three cases and uses process- 
tracing to analyze the increases and decreases of military strength in Alaska. The qualitative 
research design of process-tracing within a case study guides the collection and analysis of 
evidence informing decision-making in the policy realm.37 Process-tracing in case studies 
identifies causal links over time.38 Thus, this method allows the researcher to analyze links 
between events and actors over time. By examining and analyzing archival documents, histories, 
and interview transcripts, a researcher can discover whether the process associated with a theory 
does in fact explain the intervening variables in a case.39 In other words, would a significant 
international threat to a country lead to the increase or decrease in military strength? A case 
study, explains Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, “is a detailed examination of an aspect
37 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage publications, 2013), 14; 
Troy J. Bouffard, “Joint Stewardship of the Barents Sea: Russian and Norwegian Policy Expectations for Preventing 
Offshore Oil Spills” (master’s thesis, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2016), 61.
38 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 18.
39 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 6.
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of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to 
other events.”40 Accordingly, I have selected cases of well-defined episodes of relative change in 
military strength in Alaska.
This thesis employs a case study framework to analyze the fluctuating military strength 
throughout Alaska’s history. A different level of threat or either a strong or limited coalition 
could affect the outcome. It focuses on three different time periods in Alaska’s history that 
exhibit a major increase or decrease in military personnel or defense spending. These cases 
exhibit noticeable differences from national level military policy, which minimizes the 
possibility that changes in Alaska simply reflect national level policy decisions. The cases 
include: World War II (1940-1945), the early Cold War years (1950-1958), and the immediate 
post-Cold War era (1993-1999).
Troop numbers represent the primary factor for choosing the cases of World War II and 
the Cold War. The World War II time period shows a sharp increase in troop strength starting in 
1941, but then these levels plummeted in 1943. This pattern differs from national troop levels, 
which were much steadier throughout this time period, reaching max levels in 1945. This thesis 
will analyze the increase and decrease that takes place during this time period and what 
influenced both trends.
During the Cold War, troop numbers in Alaska jumped in 1950 and remained at this high 
level for seven years until a sudden decrease took place in 1957. At the national level during this 
same time, like in Alaska, a sudden surge occurred in 1950, but this intensity lasted just two 
years and was followed by an abrupt drop in overall military personnel numbers. I could not find 
economic data on defense spending in Alaska prior to statehood, with the exception of the year
40 Ibid., 5.
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1953. I therefore will examine the increase in troop levels in the Territory, and their continuing 
high levels that endured beyond the reductions in troop levels at the national level in the 1950s.
Conversely, defense spending during the post-Cold War years decreased more 
dramatically in Alaska than in the nation. A rapid decrease in defense spending occurred in 
Alaska, whereas a very gradual decline ensued at the national level. This thesis will analyze this 
sudden decrease in spending and seek to explain what prompted it. Troop numbers do not play 
into this time period because around 1953 personnel levels reached a relatively stable number 
that has continued to the present, which I will analyze and briefly discuss in the second and third 
case studies to determine whether this phenomenon can be explained by one of my theoretical 
frameworks or whether it merely reflects enhanced military technology.
Department of Defense archival data have provided the information to chart the increases 
and decreases in personnel. The Census Bureau archival database provides the information to 
chart defense spending levels. National level and state level charts present the data needed to 
determine the major differences in the ebb and flow of military power at each level. Following 
the identification of each case, primary archival documents, archival transcripts of oral 
interviews, government documents, and secondary literature provide the needed information to 
analyze these Alaskan cases. However, most of the military and government documents related 
to the post-Cold War era remain classified due to national security concerns, so I was not able to 
access these documents for analysis in this thesis. Based on this, I used other sources of data that 
remain unclassified or declassified for the analysis of the post-Cold War case study.
3.5 Conclusion
Employing both structural realism theory and the advocacy coalition framework, this 
thesis examines how international and domestic politics have influenced the buildup and
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drawdown of military strength in Alaska. This thesis will use process-tracing within the case 
study methodology to determine the influences on military strength in Alaska during three 
distinct time periods: World War II, the early Cold War era, and the immediate post-Cold War 
era. After analyzing each case, I will explain how the two theories connect to explain the 
buildups and drawdowns of military personnel and increases and decreases in defense spending 
in Alaska. While structural realism generally applies to the national level decisions, adding ACF 
to the analysis sheds light on policies directed at the sub-national or state level. Within ACF, a 
coalition can use the same international factors analyzed by realism theory to push its policy 
agenda.
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Chapter 4: World War II
4.1 Introduction
On June 2, 1942, a storm lurched slowly towards the Aleutian Islands. A Japanese Naval 
Fleet positioned itself inside this storm to hide its movement from U.S. patrol planes as it came 
into striking range to bomb Dutch Harbor, an important U.S. Naval base. On June 3, 1942, Japan 
launched the first wave of aircraft towards the target.1
Unbeknownst to the Japanese fleet, however, the U.S. Army Air Corps had detected its 
presence. As the group of aircraft emerged from cloud coverage, heading towards its target, the 
United States launched anti-aircraft fire. Nonetheless, the Japanese bombarded Dutch Harbor and 
subsequently captured two Aleutian Islands, Kiska and Attu, as the Dutch Harbor attack drew the 
attention of the U.S. naval fleet in the northern Pacific away from the more western Aleutian 
islands. The battle for the Aleutians is sometimes called the forgotten war, as more decisive 
campaigns overshadowed it; however, the episode illustrated Alaska’s strategic location in 
World War II’s Pacific theater as never before.
Key events that occurred in the Northern Pacific Theater during World War II threatened 
U.S. security and its interests. Even after the United States decreased the number of troops in 
Alaska, it still faced a high international threat. Structural realism explains why the United States 
chose the defensive policy that it did during World War II. Using this theory will help explain 
why an increase and decrease took place in Alaska during this time (see Figure 4.1 below).
1 Garfield, Thousand-Mile War, 4-55. Stan Cohen, The Forgotten War: A Pictorial Histroy o f World War II in 
Alaska and Northwestern Canada, vol. 1 (Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing CO., 1981), 126.
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Figure 4.1: Military troops stationed in Alaska, 1940-1945. Troop numbers rose from 1,000 in 1940 to 152,000 in 
1943 and then dropped to 60,000 in 1945.2
This case also shows that a strong coalition formed prior to the United States’ official 
commitment to World War II, because an increase in military troop levels occurs prior to any 
major events affected it directly. However, the coalition began to dissolve prior to the end of 
World War II, which corresponds with a decrease in personnel in Alaska. The advocacy coalition 
framework explains how much a coalition can influence the military presence in Alaska. The 
application of ACF will also take into account international events that the coalition used to push 
its policy agenda.
This chapter will provide an overview on the international politics taking place in the 
world beginning in 1938 when Germany began its quest to have the preponderance of power in 
Europe. Following the overview, this chapter will discuss how the United States decided its 
foreign policy using structural realism. The second half of this chapter will provide a summary of
2 Infonnation in figure comes from Hmmnel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; Defense Manpower Data Center, 
“Dod Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications.”
56
the domestic politics starting in 1935 when Delegate Diamond took office and through the end of 
the Cold War. Again, following the summary, this chapter will discuss how a coalition 
influenced the increase and decrease of defensive capabilities in Alaska. The findings section on 
ACF will discuss how the two theories intersect and how the advocacy coalition based its 
arguments for domestic policy change on international events. The chapter will conclude with a 
summary of the degree to which the two theories explain the growth and reduction of military 
capabilities in Alaska.
4.2 International Politics
Before World War II, Europe’s multipolarity, or multiple centers of power, heightened 
the prospect of major war on the continent. From 1938 to 1939, Adolf Hitler moved against the 
minor states of Europe, and power began shifting towards Germany. The other European 
countries kept passing the buck as they tried to deter this rising power; however, this allowed 
Germany the time to amass more power than the other European powers combined.3
Owing to their unwillingness to join forces and to an expectation that others would 
counter Germany’s rise, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union did not intervene. The lack of a 
coordinated response allowed Hitler to become much stronger than its immediate neighbors -  so 
much so that other European countries could not effectively deter Germany when they finally 
reacted to its invasion of Poland.4
Although the invasion of Poland did not immediately affect the United States, U.S. 
leaders still increased the national defense budget and military strength, fearing that the United
3 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 22-23.
4 History.com Staff, “Germans Invade Poland,” A&E Networks, accessed March 17, 2018, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/germans-invade-poland.
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States might lose influence in Europe and that Germany’s growing power, especially given 
Germany’s alliance with Italy and Japan, might expand beyond the continent.
The German threat provoked the United States to authorize $113 billion in military 
spending in 1940. The Defense Department (DoD) appropriated these funds to enroll an 
additional 1.5 million people into the military by 1941.5 Of the total amount of allocated funding, 
DoD directed $5.9 billion for military construction in Alaska, primarily to build Elmendorf Air 
Base and Fort Richardson.6 Prior to the invasion of Poland, Congress and President Franklin 
Roosevelt had decided to cut funding for a new air base in Anchorage, but shortly after the 
invasion, they reinstated the $1 billion. After these increased defense expenditures in Alaska 
took place, General George Marshall, the Chief of Staff for the Army, appointed General Simon 
Bucker to oversee the improvements in defensive capabilities for Alaska.7
Concern with the ominous events in Europe caused the United States to overlook the 
changing power dynamic in the Pacific and the rising Japanese threat. Following World War I, 
the United States, Great Britain, and France had constrained the major powers in the Pacific 
through the Washington Naval, or Five-Power, Treaty of 1922, which limited the number of war 
ships they could build and the development of military facilities in the Pacific. The United 
States, Great Britain, and other powers subsequently attempted to amend the Five-Power Treaty 
at two London Conferences in the 1930s, with an aim toward further limiting Japan’s 
capabilities. Japan renounced the attempt to control its naval capacity and withdrew from the 
treaty in 1936.8 Although Congressional leaders wanted to curb the growing Japanese threat, 
President Roosevelt hesitated to create a security dilemma in the Pacific. He believed any
5 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 44.
6 Garfield, Thousand-Mile War, 62.
7 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 44; Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 69.
8 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 12, 28.
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increase in military expenditures in the Pacific could provoke additional international crises. 
Japan’s strategic aims in the Pacific Ocean were two-fold: to expand the Japanese empire and to 
provide security for the heartland of Japan. In accordance with these interests, the Japanese 
forced the United States into war with their attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States responded 
with overwhelming force, refusing to relinquish territory or show weakness to the international 
community.9
The attack on Pearl Harbor illustrated for Congress, the President, and the U.S. military 
how vulnerable Alaska stood as well, and the Army belatedly sent emergency aid to General 
Buckner.10 General Henry Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air Corps, promised twenty combat air 
squadrons, including twelve to twenty-four aircraft for each squadron, for emergency defense. 
However, as the hysteria over the attack subsided in Washington, the government allocated just 
two air squadrons to Alaska. These two squadrons took months to reach Alaska, due to 
winterization of the aircraft required prior to their departure.11
After this initial deployment of additional troops to Alaska, the number of personnel 
increased only marginally. Alaska’s military landscape remained relatively unchanged. Alaska’s 
troop strength did not begin to match that of other more active theaters of operation, like that in 
the Philippines. Although some military leaders, such as Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Naval 
Commander in the Pacific, and General George Marshall, believed that Japan did not pose a 
substantial threat to Alaska, U.S. leaders aimed to persuade the Soviet Union to attack Japan.12
Japan feared that the United States would invade the Japanese mainland from the 
Aleutian Islands, so it attempted to preempt such an attack and conduct a first strike on Alaska,
9 Ibid., 23.
10 Garfield, Thousand-Mile War, 81.
11 Ibid., 84.
12 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 64-65.
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while the United States remained unprepared for an attack.13 After the Japanese bombed Dutch 
Harbor and subsequently captured Attu and Kiska, Alaska became a priority for the United 
States. Within a year of the attack, Alaska would become one of the largest theater of operations 
during World War II on U.S. soil. Japan no longer simply posed a threat; it constituted an 
occupying force that the United States had to evict. Eventually the world would recognize that 
Japan had no plans to invade the United States through the Aleutian Islands. The attack was a 
ploy to occupy many of the U.S. forces in the Pacific theater.14
Over the next fifteen months, the United States sent troops and Air Force equipment to 
Alaska to harass the Japanese on Kiska and Attu. The military conducted continuous bombing 
missions on these two islands. These constant attacks kept the Japanese military from building 
useful defensive capabilities to counter the U.S. military operations against them. In May 1943, 
with sufficient personnel finally on hand, the U.S. military recaptured the Aleutian Islands.15
After the recapture of the islands and removal of the Japanese military, the Japanese 
Empire no longer threatened the United States in the northern Pacific. Consequently, troop 
numbers in Alaska decreased. The United States retained about 100,000 troops in the area to 
prevent Japan from sending their armed forces to other theaters and to deter it from attacking 
Alaska again. The stationing of U.S. personnel in Alaska proved effective; fearing they posed a 
threat its mainland, the Japanese Empire retained a sizable contingent of forces in northern 
Japan, including fortifications on Paramushir in the Kuril Islands. U.S. forces harassed Japanese 
troops on Paramushir with raids from the Aleutians, keeping them from other offensive actions.
13 Takahashi, “The Japanese Campaign in Alaska as Seen from the Strategic Perspective,” 33-38.
14 Morison, “Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions,” 161-63.
15 Garfield, Thousand-Mile War, 117-32.
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As World War II continued, the idea of using these forces to invade Japan faded, and troop 
numbers in Alaska dwindled. By the end of the war, only 60,000 troops remained in Alaska.16
4.2.1 Realism and International Politics
How does realism explain U.S. actions in the case outlined above? Structural realism, a 
theory developed by Kenneth Waltz, explains that states strive for power and security. According 
to Waltz, the four principles of realism are: 1) A state’s interests or a threat to those interests will 
push a nation into action; 2) These policies or actions form owing to competition between states; 
3) Calculations can reveal the policies a country will use; and 4) The success of these policies 
can be evaluated in terms of whether a state is preserved and/or strengthened through their use.17 
My analysis reveals that the United States’ actions in this case align with these principles.
An alternative theory to realism is liberalism, which states that humans and countries will 
more likely cooperate and seek peaceful solutions through negotiations, rather than relying 
primarily on military might and strictly pursuing self-interest to achieve security and maintain 
their sovereignty.18 Liberalism theory assumes that countries recognize that cooperative 
relationships benefit all parties, as opposed to believing that international relations is a zero-sum 
game in which if one country gains, the other must lose.19 This theory has a hard time explaining 
why the Japanese wanted to expand its territory in the Pacific without trying to cooperate with 
other powers in the region. Also, when Germany pushed for increasing its power in Europe by 
invading Poland, the other European powers did not try to negotiate. In this case, realism is 
better suited to explain conflict, aggression, and militaristic expansionism.
16 Morison, “Western Aleutians,” 65-66.
17 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 117.
18 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 158.
19 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 727.
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4.2.1.1 A state’s interests or a threat to those interests will push a nation into action
This case illustrates many events where U.S. interests and security were directly 
threatened by hostile forces that required the United States to protect itself. In the 1920s and 
1930s, America attempted, through diplomatic channels, to limit the rising threat of Japan in the 
Pacific. These efforts proved ineffective. Later, when Japan attacked American territory, it had to 
respond with force, or the Axis powers might have taken control of the world. In 1939, Germany 
threatened the United States’ interests by invading Poland, which caused the balance of power to 
shift in Europe. The United States had allies, trading partners, and economic interests in Europe, 
and Germany endangered the future of these groups and their ideals. The United States 
recognized the threat to its interests and was compelled to act. Although the United States did not 
declare war in 1939, it began to increase its troop levels and produced more military equipment 
to defend itself and to assist its allies. The actions taken by the United States align with structural 
realism, which states that a country must act when its security or interests become endangered by 
another power.
As Japan expanded its military strength in the Pacific, the United States recognized an 
increasing threat. To reduce the danger posed by Japan, the United States, Great Britain, France, 
and Italy signed a treaty with Japan limiting the construction of naval vessels in the Pacific. This 
treaty also banned the creation of new bases and improvements on already existing bases. Based 
on Alaska’s proximity to Japan, the United States slowly enhanced its defensive capabilities in 
the Territory. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 illustrated the direct threat that Japan 
posed to the United States. America could no longer rely on isolationism to protect itself from 
foreign aggression. With the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor and the capture of Attu and Kiska 
in 1942, the Japanese threat to American interests expanded. These acts caused the United States 
to spring into action and provide to Alaska one of the largest fighting forces of World War II to
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combat the Japanese threat in Alaska and beyond. The United States now created a defensive 
military posture to prevent the Japanese from advancing in the north Pacific.
After the United States recaptured the two Aleutian Islands in May of 1943 and expelled 
all Japanese soldiers from Alaska, the perceived threat to American territory dissipated, and the 
United States decreased the number of troops in Alaska. America maintained enough troop 
strength in Alaska to harass the Japanese by continuously bombing the Japanese bases in the 
Kuril Islands. The United States sent other troops from the Aleutians to other regions where the 
Axis powers posed greater threats. Defensive realism supports this choice; the United States 
retained the requisite level of forces to meet the perceived threat in the north Pacific and respond 
to future threats in the region.
4.2.1.2 These policies or actions are formed because o f competition between states
The Axis powers’ competition for power forced the United States into World War II and 
created the necessity for a large military force. Changes in the U.S. national defense policy 
developed in response to the hostile Axis powers’ quest to control the world. No central world 
power existed to regulate this struggle for more power. The decrease in troops in Alaska 
following American removal of Japanese forces did not reflect an overall reduction in threat but 
a greater need for American troops elsewhere. The United States retained sufficient military 
strength in Alaska to deter the lingering Japanese threat in the north Pacific.
4.2.1.3 Calculation can be used to discover the policies a country will use
As structural realism explains, a country will create policies to counter a potential threat 
to its interest or its power. Additionally, a country will assess the cost versus the benefit of 
providing additional assets to an area and if that increase will provide additional security or a rise
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in power. A state can do this by increasing its military capabilities to rival a hostile force or 
bandwagon with other countries to check a growing danger; in this case, the United States did 
both. When Germany began to increase its military capacity in Europe and threatened the 
security of its neighbors, the United States increased its defenses and started building war 
materials to send to Europe. Germany’s ability to attack North America by air from the North 
spurred the United States to increase its defensive capabilities in Alaska. When Japan attacked 
Pearl Harbor, the United States responded by increasing military forces in the Pacific, including 
in Alaska. When the Japanese attacked and occupied western Alaska, the United States could not 
sit by and let this threat grow so close to the rest of America. The United States decided the best 
course of action would consist of deploying troops to eliminate this threat to its security.
As the threat in Alaska decreased the United States reduced the number of troops in the 
Territory. The Japanese still had troops stationed close to Alaska that potentially threatened the 
United States, so the Army maintained enough troop strength in Alaska to meet the threat level. 
The United States removed a majority of the troops from Alaska owing to perceived greater 
threats elsewhere in the world. That is, the United States placed troops where it perceived the 
greatest threats. The troops who remained in Alaska provided the level of defense needed to meet 
conceivable continued threats to the area.
4.2.1.4 Success o f these policies is shown in that a state was both preserved and strengthened
The United States’ policy to increase its military capabilities was ultimately successful. 
The United States focused the concentration of military strength on Alaska when Japan directly 
threatened the United States in that area; which enabled the United States to defeat this hostile 
force. Following the U.S. victory in Alaska, it decreased its troop levels, keeping only a 
sufficient number of troops in the region to provide a deterrence to further aggression in the
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region, while sending others to locations where they could be better used. These decisions 
contributed to the Allied victory and to America becoming stronger and preserving its territories.
4.3 Domestic Politics
In the 1940s, Washington focused on the war effort and national defense of the country.
During this time, members of Congress and other actors tried to sway public policies in favor of
their states. During a House Committee on Military Affairs meeting, Representatives discussed
military construction in Alaska. The Chairman of the Committee, John McSwain, asked
Representative Wesley Lloyd of Washington whether the government should build an air base in
Alaska or Washington. Representative Lloyd responded:
Should it ever come to a question of priority, I would say that the state of Washington 
must have first consideration, because within that state are those infinitely great cities, 
that infinitely rich territory. An enemy intrenched [sic] in Alaska would still to all intents 
and purposes be removed from the United States. An enemy intrenched [sic] on the 
Pacific slope of the continental United States would be able, as I have suggested, to 
harass our cities.20
Alaskan representatives had to defend against this mindset and convince others of Alaska’s 
strategic importance. Delegate Anthony Dimond, Alaska Governor Ernest Gruening, General 
Simon Buckner, General Delos Emmons, and General John L. Dewitt advocated for Alaska, 
requesting increased resources in the 1940s.
Delegate Dimond had been Alaska’s Congressional delegate since 1933. Although he 
could not vote, because of his non-Representative status, he used his personality and intelligence 
to win over colleagues. As soon as he took office, he started to warn Congress of the Japanese 
threat to Alaska and the western United States. According to historian Mary Mangusso, he once
20 Air Defense Bases: To Authorize the Selection, Construction Installation, and Modification of Permanent Stations 
and Depots for the Army Air Corps, and Frontier Air-Defense Bases Generally. Hearings on H.R. 6621 and H.R. 
4130, Before the Committee on Military Affairs, 74th Cong., (February 11, 12, 13 1935) (statement of Wesley 
Lloyd, Representative of Washington).
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“likened himself to Cato ... he never ended a speech without saying ... ‘Carthage must be 
destroyed.’”21 His message was clear: Alaska’s geographic position lay closest to Japan along the 
North Pacific Great Circle Route, and the United States must defend it accordingly.
Dimond assisted in convincing key military leaders that defending Alaska would defend 
the West Coast. General Marshall and General Arnold testified at Congressional subcommittee 
hearings on the need for additional defenses in Alaska. Following Germany’s invasion of Poland, 
Dimond explained to lawmakers that Germany could fly over the Arctic Ocean to attack North 
America. “We [the United States] can no longer rely for safety upon the isolation which was 
once afforded us by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.”22 After Pearl Harbor, Delegate Dimond 
explained that although Alaskans are “not on the firing line, they are only one step removed from 
it.”23 Dimond used these incidents to convince lawmakers to increase defense expenditures in 
Alaska.
The report of Japan’s attack on Dutch Harbor that reached Washington did not have the 
full details, as the military still needed to gather additional information of the full extent of the 
situation. The initial report only stated that Japanese forces had attacked and captured U.S. soil. 
Dimond exploited the lag time, informing Congress that twenty-five thousand Japanese soldiers 
occupied the Aleutians, with the intent to attack mainland Alaska. Representative John Coffee of 
Washington followed suit and pushed the narrative that Japan planned to invade the western 
United States. Although neither lawmaker had accurate information, each wanted to rouse 
Congress to elicit an immediate military response.24
21 Cato was a Roman who was alarmed about the danger to his country for the strength and power of Carthage. 
Mangusso, “Anthony J. Dimond,” 315.
22 Ibid., 346.
23 Ibid., 347.
24 Ibid., 351.
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President Roosevelt had appointed Ernest Gruening as Governor of Alaska in 1939. 
Gruening strongly advocated for Alaska’s national defense needs and created the Alaska 
National Guard in August 1940. That same year, the War Department tasked the U.S. military 
with helping to organize, train, and equip the State’s National Guard soldiers.25
In his annual report to the Secretary of the Interior of 1940, Gruening discussed the lack 
of defensive capabilities in Alaska. Gruening hoped that by writing the Interior Secretary, he 
could exert pressure on Congress to approve additional defense expenditures in Alaska. In this 
first annual report, Gruening noted that the Army and Navy each had only one establishment in 
Alaska, with only a small number of personnel.26 Another report he wrote at the end of 1941, to 
the Secretary of the Interior, acknowledged that defense construction had greatly increased, but 
more was needed to effectively defend against the growing threat of Japan in the Pacific.27 
Gruening’s 1942 report reflected the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Dutch Harbor. He stressed the 
need for further fortification and troops: “Alaska has been attacked and invaded, and both native 
Alaskans and members of our armed forces have died in action repelling the enemy invasion of 
North America.”28
Meanwhile, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Gruening traveled to Washington to discuss 
Alaska’s needs. In May 1942, he talked to President Roosevelt at length about Alaska’s national 
defense needs, including the need for additional aircraft to defend its wide-open expanses.29 In
25 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 69-71; Marston, Men o f the Tundra: Eskimos at War, 42­
43.
26 Ernest Gruening, 1940 Annual Report o f the Governor o f  Alaska to the Secretary o f the Interior (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 1-2.
27 Ernest Gruening, 1941 Annual Report o f the Governor o f  Alaska to the Secretary o f the Interior (Washinton D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 1-2.
28 Ernest Gruening, 1942 Annual Report o f the Governor o f  Alaska to the Secretary o f the Interior (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), 1.
29 Buckner to Dewitt, May 14, 1942, Official Correspondence General Simon Buckner (OC Gen. Buckner), Records 
of U.S. Army Forces in Alaska (Rec. of Army AK), Record Group (RG) 547, National Archives at College Park 
(NACP), College Park, MD.
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response to this meeting, as well as a Department of the Navy memo saying the U.S. Navy could 
not handle even minor threats to Alaska, the President took action. He directed the War and 
Navy Departments to provide more support to the northern Pacific region. This increased 
attention from the Departments of War and Navy assisted General Buckner in accomplishing his 
mission of improving Alaska’s defenses, by increasing necessary expenditures and a rise in 
military personnel.30
The Army Chief of Staff hand-picked Buckner for the assignment of building and 
improving Alaska’s defenses in 1940, owing to his outgoing personality and tenacious spirit. As 
he developed a love for Alaska and its opportunities, Buckner endeavored to educate the 
Pentagon and the War Department on the geography and the landscape of Alaska. He suspected 
that many in Washington thought of Alaska as a frozen landscape, with great expanses of snow 
and ice and polar bears floating on icebergs all year long.31 Buckner invited military leaders to 
visit Alaska in an attempt to increase the number of knowledgeable “ambassadors in 
Washington.”32 He also hosted the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense 
Program prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, with the aim of educating Senators on the need to 
increase military expenditures in Alaska to better provide for national defense.
Although the military received a significant increase in its operating budget in 1941 prior 
to Pearl Harbor, Alaska continued to rank low on its list of priorities. Buckner continued to fear 
that the War Department would send further troops to Alaska only “after some overt hostile 
act.”33 He sent notes to Marshall, and worked with the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) in
30 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 60.
31 One example of this mindset was the War Department sent up a newly designed tractor for testing in deep soft 
snow, but they sent this test team up to Alaska in June. This team flew all over Alaska looking for the snow they 
thought that they would see on the ground.
32 Buckner to Charles Herrick, July 16, 1942, OC Gen. Buckner, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, 
MD.
33 Buckner to Dewitt, July 16, 1941, OC Gen. Buckner, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, MD.
68
Alaska to secure additional military funding.34 Buckner and the Army required that all CAA 
airfields in Alaska conform to military standards.35
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Buckner doubled his efforts. He sent regular radio 
requests to Washington for increased air strength. Capitalizing on Japanese broadcasts claiming 
that along with Pearl Harbor, the Empire had destroyed Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Fairbanks, 
and occupied Anchorage, Buckner warned that the Japanese had plans to bomb Alaska the same 
day they attacked Hawaii.36
Buckner’s supervisor, General John L. Dewitt, the commander of the Western Defense 
Command responsible for the defenses of America’s West Coast from Southern California to 
Alaska, also requested on multiple occasions increased military allocations for Alaska. Dewitt 
requested from Marshall additional troops and funds to construct more air fields. Close friends, 
Dewitt and Marshall easily communicated about Alaska’s needs.37 Even after his reassignment to 
the Joint Officer Training School, Dewitt remained interested in Alaska’s military 
development.38
In 1944, Dewitt replaced Buckner with General Delos Emmons as Alaska’s commander, 
believing that his aviation background would benefit the territory.39 Coinciding with this transfer, 
defense expenditures in Alaska began to decrease. Emmons did not see a continued strategic 
need for additional troops to defend the United States because the threat in the North Pacific had
34 The Civil Aeronautics Authority was the predecessor to the Federal Aviation Administration. The CAA also had a 
separate funding stream to build and improve airfields in Alaska.
35 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 59. Buckner to Dewitt, July 30, 1941, Miscellaneous 
Correspondence General Simon Buckner (MC Gen. Buckner), Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, 
MD.
36 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 2: 1918-1945, 118; Buckner to Dewitt December 19, 1941, OC Gen. 
Buckner, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, MD.
37 Dewitt to Marshall, June 4, 1941, OC Gen. Buckner, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, MD.
38 Buckner to Dewitt, May 22, 1944, MC Gen. Buckner, OC Gen. Buckner, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, 
College Park, MD.
39 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 22.
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been neutralized. When his subordinate commanders asked for additional supplies, Emmons 
questioned their necessity and oftentimes denied the requests, finding them unnecessary.40 
Emmons also requested the early departure of some units from Alaska due to the lack of a 
defensive mission.41 These decisions may have reflected his assessment of the greater need for 
troops elsewhere to assist in the war effort.
Many national and territorial newspapers expressed support for increased military 
expenditures in Alaska for the protection of America. The New York Times bolstered support for 
defense expenditures in Alaska by reporting on events there (see image below). These articles 
increased public awareness of the possibility that Japan could use Alaska as a staging ground to 
invade the American west coast. Furthermore, The New York Times published the topics of the 
annual reports that Gruening sent to the Department of the Interior, thereby lending support to 
Gruening’s arguments.42
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40 Anderson to Emmons Sep 8, 1945, Official Correspondence General Delos Emmons (OC Gen. Emmons), Rec. of 
Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, MD..
41 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987. Emmons to Army War Department Chief of Staff, 
November 15, 1945, OC Gen. Emmons, Rec. of Army AK, RG 547, NACP, College Park, MD.
42 “Stresses Alaska as Defense Link,” New York Times, December 11, 1941.
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Another media source, The New Republic, with a founding mission statement asserting 
the need to influence American politics and public opinion, stressed the need for additional 
defensive resources in Alaska. It informed the public that the Aleutian Islands sat along the 
North Pacific Great Circle Route, in the closest proximity to Japan.43 Also, The Saturday 
Evening Post, a popular magazine in America at the time, published an article “Our Neglected 
Possession,” which urged the public to support defense measures in Alaska.44
Following the recapture of the Aleutian Islands, these news sources decreased their 
coverage on Alaska, focusing instead on the actions taking place in the southern Pacific and 
Europe. This change in media reporting on Alaska coincides with the decrease in military 
personnel starting in late 1943. The media no longer felt a need to report on the Aleutians 
because the enemy had been defeated in the North Pacific. The threat to the United States and its 
interests still existed throughout the world, which occupied the attention of the media and the 
public.
4.3.1 Advocacy Coalition Framework and Domestic Politics
To what extent did coalitions impact the national defense policy in Alaska? Prior 
historical context is needed to fully understand the increase and decrease that takes place from 
1940 to 1945; therefore, this analysis begins in 1933 when Dimond took office. By analyzing 
this extended amount of time, I have found links between the individuals influencing policy 
change in Alaska and the changes in defensive capabilities in Alaska. Analyzing this time period 
made it possible to observe the variety of strategies the actors pursued and to obtain a reasonably 
accurate portrayal of the successes and failures of the coalition. ACF explains variations of a
43 George Eliot, “The Aleutians and National Defense,” The New Republic 95, no. 1223 (1938): 21-22.
44 Wesley Stout, “Our Neglected Possession,” The Saturday Evening Post, Fedruary 21, 1942.
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coalition’s effect on policy change using the following principles: 1) the players of the policy 
coalition must stay focused and engaged, 2) the actors in a coalition come from all levels of 
government and utilize multiple avenues of influence, and 3) external shocks can help generate 
policy change. Given these three premises, ACF also accounts for the external factors (or shocks) 
that the coalition uses to advance its goals in terms of policy changes.
4.3.1.1 The players o f the coalition must stay focused and engaged
The actors in this coalition had individual reasons to advocate for policy changes, but 
some of their actions resulted in increases in U.S. defense troops levels in Alaska. Dimond’s 
personality and perseverance won many senior military officials and policy makers over to his 
side as he advocated for increased defensive capabilities in Alaska. Gruening also used all the 
channels available to him to push for additional defenses in Alaska. He worked through the 
Department of the Interior to increase recognition of Alaska’s strategic importance to America. 
Gruening even went directly to the President to lobby for this cause. Buckner and Dewitt used 
military channels to advocate for military personnel and infrastructure in Alaska. With continued 
and intense pressure, Buckner convinced senior military leaders in the War Department of his 
position. Finally, The New York Times and the other media sources increased government and 
public recognition of the Japanese threat in Alaska and furthered the perception that Alaska’s 
defense levels could not provide adequate security for the Territory or nation.
Two parties of the coalition, General Emmons and the media, led to the destabilization of 
the coalition, which contributed to a decrease in defense allocations in Alaska, beginning in mid- 
1943. After direct conflict with the Japanese ended in Alaska, The New York Times and other 
prominent news sources stopped reporting on Alaska, which decreased the public’s awareness of
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Alaska’s ongoing strategic significance to America’s security.45 Also, Emmons did not advocate 
for additional military resources, because the war still occupied other parts of Alaska. He even 
requested the early departure of a unit because he did not see a defensive need for them to 
remain. On another occasion, one of Emmons’ subordinate commanders requested additional 
equipment, near the end of 1944, returning from overseas be directed to Alaska; however, his 
investigation into the request concluded that the equipment was not needed and could be used 
elsewhere to support the continued war effort.
4.3.1.2 The actors in a coalition should come from different levels o f government and utilize 
multiple avenues o f influence
The individuals associated with this coalition represented both levels and different 
branches of government, as well as the military, and they reflected a variety of perspectives on 
the needs in Alaska. This diversity of perspectives and the networks through which they 
operated, provided multiple avenues or channels through which to advocate for desired change. 
Buckner and Gruening knew firsthand what Alaska needed in defensive capabilities. They 
conducted multiple assessments and reported to their direct superiors what assets were needed to 
defend Alaska.
4.3.1.3 External shocks can help generate policy change
The coalition responded to international events, using them to bolster their arguments for 
additional resources for Alaska. The increasingly alarming events of Germany’s invasion of 
Poland, and the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor followed by the attacks in Alaska, provided
45 Despite exhaustive efforts, I found no articles that advocated for additional troops in Alaska following the 
recapture of Kiska and Attu from the Japanese.
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evidence of the need to fortify Alaska as a means of protecting American safety and sovereignty. 
Alaska’s representatives reminded policy makers of these acts of aggression as they lobbied for 
increased defense expenditures in Alaska. However, after the United States recaptured the 
Aleutian Islands, the coalition’s evidence of the threats to America through Alaska dissipated. 
The United States had evicted the enemy in the northern Pacific; after that event, no other 
international event demanded the sending of additional troops to Alaska.
This application of ACF illustrates that when a strong coalition formed in the beginning 
of World War II, it effectively influenced policy change, which led to an increase in military 
personnel in Alaska. When the coalition broke down, in the context of a reduced relative threat in 
the north Pacific, troop levels dropped.
This case study integrates the theory of realism at the international level and the ACF at 
the domestic level to explain defensive capabilities in a sub-national region - Alaska. Structural 
realism focuses on national policies and how countries respond to external threats. By also 
applying the ACF to this analysis, I can analyze the domestic forces that interacted to influence 
policy -  defense expenditures in Alaska in this case. The United States acted to halt the Axis 
powers’ aims to dominate the world, by increasing the size of its military and defensive 
capabilities. The coalition influenced where those military forces should be directed to best 
counter the threat. The coalition responded to international events, using them as evidence as 
they advocated for defense expenditures and troop deployments to Alaska. Without the effective 
use of these ominous international events by this energetic coalition, Alaska would not have 
received the allocations it did. Conversely, with no further major international events in the 
northern Pacific to generate concerns about threats to America through Alaska, the coalition fell 
apart and the number of troops in Alaska declined.
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4.4 Conclusion
Both structural realism and the ACF prove useful in explaining increases and decreases in 
U.S. military expenditures in Alaska during WWII. Realism theory explains that U.S. interests 
around the world were compromised at this time and that the United States reacted to ensure its 
security. Military troops were deployed to Alaska to prevent the Japanese from dominating the 
Pacific and potentially invading the United Sates. When perceptions of the threat to America 
through Alaska declined, the government moved the soldiers to different active theaters in 
Europe and the southern Pacific.
ACF also illustrates that the various members of the coalition played a significant role in 
influencing the troop levels in Alaska. The coalition drew upon the external shocks of major 
international events to convince policy makers of the need to defend Alaska. When the threat to 
Alaska declined, the media refocused its attention elsewhere, and when a key figure in the 
coalition was replaced, the strength of the coalition waned, resulting in a decline in troops in 
Alaska.
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Chapter 5: The Beginning of the Cold War
5.1 Introduction
The Soviet-backed North Korean People’s Army’s invasion of South Korea in 1950 
caught the world by surprise. With Soviet-supplied tanks and weapons, the North Korean 
People’s Army captured 90 percent of South Korea, including Seoul. Upon the U.N. Security 
Council’s approval, U.S.-led U.N. forces came to the assistance of South Korea and prevented 
the complete takeover of the country. The U.N. coalition forces pushed the North Korean Army 
back, past the 38th parallel, almost to the border of China. Fearing that the United States would 
not stop at the border, China supported North Korea in its recapture of territory to the 38th 
parallel.1
This early Cold War conflict incentivized the U.S. government to put military troops in 
Alaska on high alert. Alaska’s proximity to East Asia made it an ideal location to station troops 
for quick assistance in the war effort in Korea. Congress and the Pentagon hurriedly worked to 
increase the number of military personnel in Alaska to address the threat from North Korea and 
communism itself.2
During the early years of the Cold War the United States faced a high international threat 
similar to the beginning of World War II, even though no direct conflict between the Soviet 
Union and the United States took place. This perceived threat lay in the belief of a possible 
invasion of the United States by the Soviet Union, and it escalated when the Soviet Union gained 
nuclear capabilities. During the early Cold War era, a strong coalition lobbied for increasing
1 Millett, “Korean War: 1950-1953.”
2 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 65.
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Alaska’s defensive capabilities. The members of this coalition used the various avenues available 
to them through different government branches and agencies to achieve their policy aims.
This chapter applies structural realism and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to 
the early Cold War years (1950-1958) to identify the factors influencing the increase, stability, 
and decrease of U.S. military personnel in Alaska (see Figure 5.1 below). This chapter will 
consist of two main sections that provide a narrative of events taking place internationally 
followed by domestic politics that identifies the individuals involved in Alaska’s military and 
political leadership during this time period. It will then conclude with how these theories relate to 
each other to explain the escalation and reduction of the military presence in Alaska.
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Figure 5.1: U.S. Military Troops in Alaska, 1950-1958.3
5.2 International Politics
Following World War II, the world transitioned from multipolarity, with Germany,
Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States holding power, to bipolarity, consisting of
3 Infonnation in chart comes from Hummel, “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; Defense Manpower Data Center, 
“Dod Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications.”
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the United States and Soviet Union as superpowers. Three primary conditions or events led to 
this shift following the war. First, the Allies destroyed the Axis alliance by occupying Germany, 
dismembering the German Reich, and defeating and occupying Japan. Second, the Soviet Union 
grew more powerful, expanding its control westward on the European continent. The Soviet 
Union used the power vacuum4 left in Eastern Europe after World War II to occupy the countries 
of Eastern Europe, creating a protective buffer around the Soviet Union. While analysts today 
generally agree that Stalin did not aspire to Marxist/Leninist goals of world domination, his 
forceful tactics in the Eastern Bloc threatened the rest of Europe. Third, the United States, in 
conjunction with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and at the 
invitation of Western European NATO members, put a permanent military presence in Europe to 
curb the Soviet threat. Owing to these reasons, an East-West power struggle ensued.5
The Soviet Union and the United States increased their troop levels and developed 
technological capabilities, including nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missiles, to deter one 
another. When the Soviet Union developed the atomic bomb in 1949, the United States and 
Canada feared that a nuclear strike would originate from Siberia; thus, Alaska became the first 
location to host anti-nuclear capabilities, which led to an increase in personnel and technology.6
Prior to the Korean War, President Harry Truman and Secretary of State George Kennan 
feared the power that the Soviet Union began to exercise over Europe and East Asia. Kennan 
believed that if  the United States placed vigilant forces at strategic political and geographical 
locations anywhere the Soviet Union showed signs of encroachment upon the interests of other
4 A power vacuum refers to a country quickly losing control of a territory and another country moves in to become 
the dominate force before another government is established. This happened in Eastern Europe when the Soviet 
Union moved in and established dominance over Eastern Europe after Germany was defeated.
5 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 27-28.
6 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 201-16.
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states, they could contain the Soviet pressure on the capitalist Western countries.7 When George 
Kennan wrote, “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” the Soviet Union’s attention focused on Europe; 
however, it later spread to East Asia during the early years of the Cold War. The United States 
stationed troops near or in Europe and East Asia to begin its containment policy.
In the early years of the Cold War, the United States feared the spread of communism. 
The conflict of the Korean peninsula would test this new policy of containment. Following 
World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union split the Korean peninsula at the 38th 
parallel after liberating it from Japan. These two countries installed a government that supported 
the occupying forces. Prior to 1950, the United States and the Soviet Union turned over control 
of the peninsula to these two Korean governments. However, the North Korean government 
wanted a united Korean peninsula under its rule; thus in 1950, it invaded South Korea. The 
United States petitioned the United Nations to condemn this action. This led to the United 
Nations supporting a U.S.-led U.N. force to assist the South Korean people. During the course of 
the war, China assisted the North Korean Army to fight this U.N. force.8 The Korean War 
demonstrated the domino theory, which explains that once a state becomes influenced by 
communism the surrounding states will follow and spread this mindset, which would eventually 
threaten the West.9 The U.S. containment policy aimed to stop the spread of communism and 
prevent the Soviet Union from becoming the hegemon on the continents of Europe and Asia.10 
This apprehension heightened the need to place military personnel in Alaska.
The Soviet Union continued to build up its military, and, by 1951, it had the largest 
conventional force in the world, surpassing the United States.11 Accordingly, the United States
7 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July, 1947).
8 Millett, “Korean War: 1950-1953.”
9 Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” 573.
10 Henry Kissinger, “Reflections on Containment,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (June, 1994).
11 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 66.
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began to focus on increasing the size of its military forces to balance the threat of the Soviet 
Union’s military troops. Simultaneously, the United States entered into a nuclear arms race with 
the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. first tested an atomic bomb in 1949, essentially copying the 
device the United States used in Japan in 1945. The United States first tested a hydrogen bomb in 
1952, and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1955. The arms race escalated, with nuclear arms 
providing the main deterrent to aggression by either party, given that a nuclear strike would 
result in Mutually Assured Destruction -  the certain annihilation of large percentages of both 
countries’ populations and the fall of their governments. Both sides understood that neither could 
win a nuclear war.12
Given the growing nuclear threat, the United States began creating new ways to monitor 
for and counter these nuclear weapons. The United States maintained a high troop level during 
the early years of the Cold War, from 1950 to 1953, but these troop levels began to fall when 
nuclear technology took precedence. President Eisenhower believed in the need for additional 
technology and nuclear weapons of a large conventional force, so he cut back on military 
personnel and placed priority on developing nuclear weapons.13 In Alaska, troop levels followed 
a slightly different pattern; the United States built up the military troop levels to around fifty 
thousand by 1951, and this number remained consistent for the next six years. During the early 
years of the Cold War, the Pentagon believed that if the Soviet Union invaded the United States, 
it would do so through Alaska.14 Also by the early 1950s, the Soviet Union improved its aircraft 
technology to have the capability to fly from Siberia to the West Coast of the United States and 
back. This feat made it paramount for the United States to build an early warning system to 
detect any inbound planes. It entered into a cooperative agreement with the Canadian
12 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 19-20; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations, 54-70.
13 Boyle, American-Soviet Relations, 125-126.
14 Nielson, Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier, 195.
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government to construct a Distant Early Warning system, commonly called the DEW Line, from 
Alaska’s Arctic coast eastward across Arctic Canada, beginning in 1954. Eventually the line of 
radar stations extended from the Aleutian Chain in the west to Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands in the east.15
When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the power dynamic of the world 
changed once again. It introduced the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This 
technology offered the great powers new defensive and offensive capabilities. The great powers 
searched for ways to counter this new type of missile threat. In the United States, military troop 
numbers began to decrease, as anti-missile technology increased, thus maintaining the balance of 
power between the two superpowers. Although this shift to technology coincided with a decrease 
in personnel in Alaska, the territory and later state remained the best strategic location to monitor 
for any possible missile attack on the United States.16
5.2.1 Realism and International Politics
This section will apply Waltz’s principles of structural realism17 to analyze the time 
period and series of events outlined above. My evaluation reveals that the United States’ actions 
in the case correspond with structural realism.
Liberalism provides little explanatory value to relations between the super powers during 
this era. Given the tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the existential threat 
that each believed the other posed, neither could see the potential for a “win-win” outcome 
through cooperation during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States felt compelled 
to increase their defensive capabilities by building up their conventional and nuclear forces.
15 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 106-08; Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 206-08.
16 Boyle, American-Soviet Relations, 130.
17 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 117.
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Realism thus better explains the distrust each country felt towards the other and their 
unwillingness to cooperate for the benefit of the world.
5.2.1.1 A state’s interests or a threat to those interests will push a nation into action
According to structural realism, a state’s interests or a threat to those interests will push a 
nation into action. When the Soviet Union moved into the power vacuum in East Europe at the 
close of World War II, the United States feared that it aimed to establish hegemony over the 
European continent, and it thus felt the need to respond. Together with its allies in the North 
Atlantic region, it formed NATO, a mutual defense pact. Furthermore, when the Soviet-backed 
communist government of North Korea attacked South Korea, the United States once again felt 
compelled to act. It went to the United Nations to build support for an international coalition to 
repel the attack. If North Korea proved successful in capturing South Korea, the Soviet Union 
could become the hegemon of Asia, which would have decreased the United States’ sense of 
security in the Pacific. These two early Cold War threats and the United States’ responses to 
them align with structural realism, explaining that when a state’s power, interests, or security 
appear threatened, it must respond with force or in another way that bolsters its security.
The United States also reacted to the growing threat of nuclear weapons, through its 
increase in technological capabilities. As technology increased, the level of military personnel 
decreased. The United States created a defensive screen of early warning stations, followed by 
counter weapons technology, to minimize the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons. However, at the 
same time, the United States built up its own nuclear arsenal. This decreased the need to have a 
large standing army because conventional warfare no longer posed the more serious threat to the 
country. Defensive realism, which states that nuclear weapons can deter a larger or more
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powerful country due to mutual assured destruction, explains why this decrease in military 
personnel occurred.
The United States responded to the Soviet threat in the early Cold War years with 
increased troop levels, because the Soviet Union consisted of a large conventional military. As 
the nuclear arms race escalated, the United States emphasized nuclear arms as a deterrent to 
Soviet aggression, as well as detection and counter strike capacities. The shift to primary reliance 
on a nuclear defense led to decreased troop levels in Alaska.
5.2.1.2 Foreign policies are functions o f competition between states
Structural realism states that foreign policies respond to competition between states. After 
World War II, the world moved into a bipolar international system. During this time, the United 
States and the Soviet Union competed for power, and built up their militaries and nuclear 
technology for deterrence purposes. Initially, the United States increased military personnel in 
specific regions, including Alaska, to contain the growing threat of communism in Europe and 
Asia. This buildup of troops would deter a potential Soviet invasion of the United States in 
Alaska, an event the Pentagon considered possible.
The North Korean invasion heightened the tension between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. When this conflict began, the United States positioned additional troops in Alaska 
due to its proximity to the hostilities, to demonstrate its troop strength and triumph in its 
competition with the Soviet Union in Asia. Troop levels in Alaska remained high following the 
Korean War to assist in monitoring the growing Soviet aircraft and missile threats. It could not 
allow the Soviet Union to win the arms race.
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5.2.1.3 Calculations are used to discover the policies a country will use
Structural realism explains that countries will use cost-benefit analysis to determine 
levels of defense (and other) expenditures to make and where to spend those dollars. The United 
States decided on increasing its military to deter and contain the Soviet Union during this time, 
and it relied less on conventional deterrence as it increasingly relied on nuclear deterrence. When 
the Soviet Union threatened U.S. interests with conventional forces, the United States responded 
by increasing its military personnel. The United States then positioned those troops at the most 
strategic locations to counter any possible Soviet hostilities.
The United States believed Alaska remained the best place to deter Soviet action in East 
Asia. Alaska’s proximity to the Soviet Union and other communist countries provided the United 
States a substantial force location to quickly address any potential threat. The United States also 
feared Soviet forces would invade the United States through Alaska, which made it necessary for 
the United States to increase its military capabilities. Accordingly, the United States and Soviet 
Union responded to each other’s development of nuclear technology. Alaska once again held the 
best position to monitor for and counter any possible nuclear threat to the United States.
As Eisenhower demonstrated during his time in office, the United States started to focus 
its attention on the nuclear arms race and not on conventional forces. It believed that its nuclear 
arsenal would deter the Soviet Union more than the size of its military. This also caused the 
United States to increase its antinuclear capabilities further limiting the defense budget spent on 
troop levels.
5.2.1.4 Success o f these policies is shown where a state was both preserved and strengthened
Finally, structural realism examines the success of policies in preserving and
strengthening countries to confirm its explanatory power. The United States’ policies of
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containment and deterrence ensured that it maintained its level of power in the world and 
protected the security of the nation and its people. Neither superpower achieved the 
preponderance of power over the other to truly threaten its sovereignty. Policies preserved the 
status quo and decreased the likelihood of nuclear war.
5.3 Domestic Politics
Along with international factors, domestic politics played a role in shaping defensive 
capabilities in Alaska. Within the domestic realm, a strong coalition fought for additional 
military assets in Alaska during the early Cold War, much like what happened prior to and 
during World War II. Many individuals from the state and national levels of government and the 
military formed this coalition. The media also influenced these decisions early in the Cold War. 
However, the coalition eventually deteriorated due to its focus shifting to statehood, which 
coincided with a decrease in military assets in Alaska.
Anthony Dimond’s protege, E.L. (Bob) Bartlett, took over as Alaska’s delegate to the 
U.S. Congress in 1945. Bartlett continued in Dimond’s footsteps and also pushed for more 
defensive capabilities in Alaska. In 1949, Bartlett sponsored an investigative reporter, Fergus 
Hoffman, to speak in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee after Hoffman wrote an 
article for the Seattle Post, titled “Uncle Sam is asleep in the North again.” Bartlett and Hoffman 
urged the Appropriations Committee to fund more military construction and station more troops 
in Alaska. On multiple occasions, Bartlett sat down with President Truman and Defense 
Secretary Forrestal to discuss the ever-growing need for additional military troops in Alaska.18 
During the early years of the Cold War, Bartlett’s efforts paid off: Congress authorized an
18 Mary Council, Bob Bartlett’s Washington Newsletter 1948-1962 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1962).
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increase in military personnel. However, beginning in 1956, Bartlett started devoting more of his 
time to the statehood fight.19
Governor Ernest Gruening also continued to fight for additional military troops for 
Alaska. He accompanied Bartlett on several occasions to meetings with Congressmen and 
women to discuss the nation’s defenses.20 He conducted many interviews with national media 
sources to ensure the American public understood the security implications of Alaska’s not 
receiving sufficient defense allocations. In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, called 
“Alaska - Another Pearl Harbor?” Gruening stressed that a small Soviet military unit could easily 
overrun Alaska’s defenses.21 Gruening also gave many speeches about defensive needs, which 
major news networks broadcast to the American public.22
During Gruening’s tenure in office, Lieutenant General Nathan Twining assumed 
command of all forces in Alaska, and started his own quest to build up the defenses of Alaska. 
When the Senate Subcommittee on Defensive Preparedness visited Alaska in 1950 to evaluate 
military preparedness, Twining explained that Alaska needed an increase in military troops to 
effectively defend America. After its visit, the subcommittee agreed with Twining and 
recommended that Congress increase defense spending to bring additional troops to protect the 
territory from the growing national threat from the Soviet Union. Based on this subcommittee’s 
request Alaska received an additional twenty-five thousand troops bringing the total to fifty 
thousand.23
19 Claus-M Naske, Edward Lewis “Bob ” Bartlett o f  Alaska: ... a Life in Politics (Fairbanks, AK: University of 
Alaska Press, 1979), 142-60.
20 Council, Bob Bartlett’s Washington Newsletter 1948-1962.
21 “Alaska- Another Pearl Harbor?” An interview with Ernest Gruening, November 18, 1949, Ernest Gruening 
Papers (EGP) (1914-1974), Alaska and Polar Regions Department (APRD), Elmer E. Rasmuson Library (EER 
Library), University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), Fairbanks, AK.
22 “Alaska and Our National Defense,” Speech by Ernest Gruening at Eielson Air Force Base, September 25, 1950, 
EGP (1914-1974), APRD, EER Library, UAF, Fairbanks, AK.
23 Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3: 1945-1987, 72-73; Interview with General Nathan Twining, 1973, 
Alaska Command Oral History Program (ALCOM OHP), Air Force Historical Research Agency Archives Branch
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Both Bartlett and Gruening admired Twining so much, owing to the amount of defense 
related capabilities and funding he acquired for Alaska, that they petitioned the Secretary of 
Defense and the military Chief of Staff to retain him when they wanted to reassign him in 
1950.24 Nonetheless, the Pentagon reassigned him as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In this 
new position, Twining continued to assist Alaska with its defense. For example, he ensured that 
the Air Force base on Shemya remained operational, so that Air Force personnel could continue 
to monitor the Soviet Union.25
Following Twining’s tenure in Alaska, which concluded near the end of 1950, Lieutenant 
General William Kepner took over and continued to increase Alaska’s defenses. Kepner testified 
before Congress on the need for defensive capabilities to monitor for Soviet aircraft. However, 
Kepner failed to convince Congress, so near the end of his tour of duty in 1953, military troop 
numbers reached their height at just over fifty thousand. Although national levels would begin to 
drop by over 100,000 around 1953, Alaska’s level remained constant at around 50,000 for an 
additional five years in Alaska.26
Meanwhile, Frank Heintzleman replaced incumbent Gruening as Alaska’s Governor in 
1953. Heintzleman’s vision for Alaska differed considerably from Gruening’s. Prior to becoming 
Governor, Heintzleman worked with the U.S. Forestry Services in Alaska, giving him a good 
understanding of Alaska’s natural resources. While in office, he focused on improving Alaska’s 
economy by supporting the mineral and timber industries;27 he did not prioritize additional
(AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), AL; Housing Report, May, 1950, Subcommittee on Defensive 
Preparedness, Record Group 46, Records of the U.S. Senate, National Archives Building, Washington D.C.
24 Bartlett to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson March 13, 1950, EGP (1914-1974), APRD, EER Library, UAF, 
Fairbanks, AK; Gruening to Johnson, March 2, 1950, EGP (1914-1974), APRD, EER Library, UAF, Fairbanks, AK.
25 Twining to Senator Magnuson, February 15, 1954, EGP (1914-1974), APRD, EER Library, UAF, Fairbanks, AK.
26 Interview with Lieutenant General William Kepner, 1973, ALCOM OHP, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.
27 Thomas McMullin, Biographical Directory o f  American Territorial Governors (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1984), 
23-25.
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military defensive capabilities. Heintzleman resigned in 1956, three months before the end of his 
term, to retire to private life. President Eisenhower then appointed Mike Stepovich as Governor. 
Stepovich came into office focused only on statehood and the admission of the territory into the 
Union.28 In his inaugural speech, Stepovich said statehood encompassed his first priority while in 
office.29
Lieutenant General Joseph Atkinson became the new Commander in Alaska when 
Kepner left in 1953. Like his predecessors, Atkinson worked diligently to increase the troop 
numbers in Alaska. He petitioned Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.30 While in command, 
Atkinson did not see an increase in military personnel. Troop levels remained relatively constant 
during his tenure in Alaska, in contrast to the decrease in troop levels that occurred at the 
national level. Atkinson also conducted interviews with major news outlets to persuade the 
American public of the need for military assets in Alaska. In a 1955 U.S. News and World Report 
interview, called “We are only 5 miles from Russia,” Atkinson stated that if a Soviet attack 
came, it would come from Siberia through Alaska because that is the shortest route.31
In 1956, Lieutenant General Frank Armstrong replaced Atkinson as Alaska’s 
commander. He also came into the office wanting to improve Alaska’s military defenses, 
viewing Alaska as vital to the defense of the United States. Armstrong feuded with both the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to achieve his goal.32 Despite his efforts, however, 
military personnel in Alaska declined beginning in 1957.
28 Terrence Cole, Fighting for the Forty-Ninth Star: C. W. Snedden and the Crusade for Alaska Statehood 
(Fairbanks, AK: University of Alaska Foundation, 2010), 297-99.
29 Naske, Bob Bartlett, 155.
30 Interview with Lieutenant General Joseph Atkinson, 1973, ALCOM OHP, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.
31 “We Are Only 5 Miles from Russia”, An Interview with General Joseph Atkinson, December 16, 1955, Bartlett, 
E.L. “Bob” Papers (1924-1970), Alaska and Polar Regions Department, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, 
AK.
32 Donald Lennon, “Armstrong, Frank Alton, Jr.,” State Library of North Carolina, accessed February 20, 2018, 
https ://www. ncpedia. org/biography/armstrong-frank-alton-jr.
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Along with other national news media, the U.S. News and World Report conducted 
interviews with and published speeches by many leaders in Alaska. Editorials about Alaska’s 
defense needs appeared in national news magazines, informing the American public. The 
Washington Post began publishing articles in 1947 detailing a “Defenseless Alaska” and the 
need for more military capabilities there.33 The Saturday Evening Post, another popular 
magazine, provided the public with information in several articles about the military in Alaska. A 
1950 article explained that the troops in Alaska “stand on the hottest spot in the Arctic -  the short 
cut from Siberia to Chicago.”34 Editors at Time even pointed out in 1950 that when Dwight 
Eisenhower held the position of Army Chief of Staff, he informed Congress that “Alaskan 
defenses were in no shape to meet the potentialities of war.”35 However, around 1956, news 
media sources began reporting on the growing struggle for statehood and essentially stopped 
reporting on the need for military capabilities in Alaska, as seen in many articles from The New 
York Times and Time.36 This lack of reporting coincides with the decrease in military personnel.
Following the push for statehood, the coalition refocused on the need for defensive 
nuclear capabilities in Alaska to secure the United States. One year after statehood -  in 1960, an 
increase in defense spending occurs in Alaska. In 1960, the military began to modernize Clear 
Air Force Base to control the new Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). This 
system could detect the intercontinental ballistic missile technology that the Soviet Union now 
had at its disposal. The new antiballistic missile technology caused an increase in defense 
spending in Alaska by over $2 billion over the next ten years.
33 Marquis Childs, “Defenseless Alaska,” Washington Post, May 3, 1947.
34 Harold Martin, “They Guard Our Arctic Frontier against the Reds,” Saturday Evening Post, September 16, 1950.
35 “Alaska: Airman’s Theater,” Time 56, no. 19 (November 6, 1950).
36 Richard Johnston, “Democrats near Alaska Victory,” New York Times, October 11, 1956; “Land of Beauty and 
Swat,” Time 71, no. 23 (1958).
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5.3.1 ACF and Domestic Politics
To what extent did actors impact the military strength in Alaska? The case examines 
eight years of national defense policy in Alaska, including the years prior to and leading into the 
Cold War. This length of time allowed tracking of the coalition’s diverse strategies to gauge 
whether it achieved success or failure in reaching its goals. The section below will consider the 
three premises of ACF to illuminate how this coalition influenced policy change.
5.3.1.1 The players o f the coalition must stay focused and engaged
To qualify as an effective advocacy coalition, members must stay focused and engaged. 
From 1949 to 1956 the actors of this coalition worked diligently to increase the number of 
military troops. Bartlett and Gruening used their connections in Washington to gain additional 
defensive assets for Alaska. Twining and Kepner used military channels along with petitioning 
Congress.
In 1953, Heintzleman and Atkinson replaced Gruening and Kepner in the coalition, 
respectively. Heinzleman did not come into the coalition with the same ferocity as Gruening 
when fighting for additional military personnel. Although Heintzleman focused on improving the 
economy of Alaska, he did so by focusing on the mineral and forestry industries rather than the 
military. Atkinson continued to push for additional troops. Although he did not achieve his goal 
of an increase, he still succeeded given the fact the military did not decline during his tenure.
In 1956, Stepovich and Armstrong replaced Heinzleman and Atkinson, respectively. 
Stepovich came into the Governorship focusing on statehood rather than on both Alaska’s and 
America’s defense. However, Armstrong pushed so hard for increasing Alaska’s military 
capabilities he made enemies of the Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Lyman Lemnitzer.
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Starting in 1947, the media stressed the lack of military personnel in Alaska and the need 
to increase these numbers in order to protect the United States from the Soviet Union. By 
conducting interviews and publishing speeches from key members of the ACF, the media 
generated support from the American public and policymakers. However, beginning in 1956, the 
media switched their reporting on Alaska issues to statehood, and this shift in focus 
corresponded with a sharp decrease in military personnel in Alaska. The increase in defense 
spending following statehood further explains how this shift in focus degraded the coalitions 
influence on defensive capabilities from 1956 to 1960.
5.3.1.2 The actors in a coalition should come from different levels o f government and utilize 
multiple avenues o f influence
An advocacy coalition must consist of members from a variety of levels and sectors and 
use multiple tactics to be deemed influential. The AC members came from various levels and 
sectors of government, had different perspectives on Alaska’s defense needs, and used the many 
different avenues available to them to advocate for defenses. The civilian and military leaders of 
Alaska knew firsthand what the territory needed in defensive capabilities. Individuals at the 
federal and territorial levels of government advocated energetically for Alaska’s needs. Alaska’s 
delegate to Congress lobbied multiple Congressional committees to advocate for more defensive 
capabilities in the territory. The military leaders also used their connections at the Pentagon to 
push for defending the United States by building up Alaska. With each player at different levels 
of government, this opened up alternate avenues to advocate for desired change in the national 
defense policy of the United States.
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5.3.1.3 External shocks can help generate policy change
ACF accounts for the coalition’s use of external shocks in its advocacy. This coalition 
began campaigning for an increase in military personnel due to the growing threat of the Soviet 
Union. The Korean War posed an additional threat that allowed these individuals to push their 
agenda. However, a few years after the Soviet Union’s domination of Eastern Europe and the 
Korean War lost its shock value, a decrease began to occur in military personnel. Alaska’s 
political leaders and the media also shifted their focus from international events and threats to the 
fight for statehood. Many within the coalition no longer took the time to advocate for military 
personnel in Alaska.
Realism theory and ACF overlapped and converged in that ACF helped identify the 
external shocks that the coalition used to steer U.S. national defense policy toward countering the 
Soviet threat and protecting America by strengthening defenses in Alaska. ACF accounts for 
how the United States distributed its defensive capabilities with increasing threats during the 
Cold War. The coalition invoked these international threats to convince leaders in Washington to 
respond by shoring up Alaska’s defenses.
5.4 Conclusion
Both structural realism and the advocacy coalition framework explain military changes in 
Alaska at the outset of the Cold War. Realism explains that the United States increased its 
military when the Soviet Union’s actions and growing power posed credible threats to U.S. 
security and interests in Europe and East Asia. It also explains the decision for an increase in 
military personnel to contain the spread of communism and prevent the Soviet Union from 
becoming a sole hegemon. Alaska’s strategic location and proximity to the Soviet Union and 
East Asia made it an ideal place for troops to counter Soviet and communist aggression. During
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this time, advances in nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race drove a shift to strategic 
deterrence. The advent of nuclear weapons required the United States to increase its strategic 
defense capacities to monitor and counter the rising nuclear threat. Meanwhile, ACF illustrates 
how a coalition formed to attract defensive capabilities for Alaska. Early in the Cold War, a 
coalition formed and strongly lobbied for military troops to defend both Alaska and the United 
States. Its efforts paid off with an increase in military personnel early in the Cold War. However, 
around 1956, many members in the coalition changed their focus to statehood, which 
corresponds to the decrease in military personnel in Alaska. This shift may also reflect a growing 
consensus around greater emphasis on strategic defense. Considered together, these two theories 
lead to a better understanding of the forces shaping the military strength in Alaska in the 1950s.
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Chapter 6: The Post-Cold War
6.1 Introduction
On August 19, 1991, communist apparatchiks launched a coup d’etat against the Soviet 
government, placing Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, under 
house arrest and attempting to force his resignation. 1 They believed Gorbachev’s reformist ideas 
would lead to the demise of the Soviet Union. Ironically, their actions, condemned widely across 
the country, hastened the fall of the Soviet Union, which occurred in December 1991. The 
breakup of the U.S.S.R. effectively ended the Cold War and left the United States as the sole 
superpower in the world.2
The post-Cold War time period from 1993 to 1999, represents a case of low international 
threat to the United States because of the fall of the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R., both Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities diminished. At the domestic level a 
limited coalition focused on Alaska’s defense capacities operated within the state. This coalition 
had reduced influence, owing to key leaders’ focus on oil as the state’s overwhelmingly 
dominant source of revenue; this emphasis on oil politics diverted potential members from 
joining the coalition. The active members of the coalition came from the national level of 
government, limiting the avenues it had to influence policy change. However, without the 
coalition defense expenditures in the state could have dropped significantly more than they did. 
U.S. military expenditures began to decline in Alaska in 1993, and the trend continued until
1 The General Secretary of the Communist party held the true power in the Soviet Union. There was a Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers who managed the executive branch, however he never exerted executive authority.
2 Brian Taylor, “The Soviet Military and Disintegration of the USSR,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (2003): 
43-49; Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 4th ed. (London, 
UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 50; Walter Conner, “Soviet Society, Public Attitudes, and the Perils of 
Gorbachev’s Reforms: The Social Context of the End of the USSR,” Journal o f  Cold War Studies 4, no. 4 (2003): 
75.
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1998, for a total reduction in military expenditures in the state of $3.5 billion during the five 
years.
This chapter analyzes events transpiring at the end of the Cold War to explain the sharp 
decline in U.S. military expenditures in Alaska in the 1990s (see Figure 6.1 below). Again, I 
apply realism and the advocacy coalition framework to shed light on U.S. defense policies at this 
time. This case study lays out two narratives, one at the international level and the other at the 
domestic level, to explain military expenditures during the post-Cold War era. It concludes by 
summarizing the theories’ power to explain the decline in U.S. military expenditures in Alaska.
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Figure 6.1: Defense Spending at the Alaska State Level 1989-1999 (millions of dollars).3
6.2 International Politics
When Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 he subscribed to a “peace through 
strength” approach to international relations, taking the position that the United States would
3 Infonnation in figure comes from Hmmnel “Alaska’s Militarized Landscape.”; U.S. Census Bureau, 
“Consolidated Federal Funds Reports.”
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negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of power during his “crusade for freedom.”4 
Reagan believed the U.S. deterrent capability had eroded during the 1970s, and he was 
determined to rebuild the military’s conventional forces. During his tenure in office, he oversaw 
the largest peacetime defense buildup in the history of the United States. The Reagan 
administration believed that this increase in military capabilities would force the Soviet Union to 
match U.S. efforts, which would bankrupt the Soviet economy.5 Thus, he planned to win the 
Cold War economically, rather than through military force.
Along with increasing the military’s conventional forces, the Reagan administration 
began to support anti-communist resistance movements around the world. It sought to replace the 
Soviet-backed governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America with pro-western regimes. His 
administration also equipped and trained the mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan to fight against 
the Soviet Army that had supported the communist government since the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979. These strong moves further destabilized the Soviet Union and accelerated 
its fall and ultimately led to the end the Cold War.6
When Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, Reagan saw an opportunity for diplomacy and 
thus negotiated with the new Soviet leader on arms reductions. Meanwhile, Gorbachev 
championed the ideas of perestroika and glasnost 7 in the Soviet Union, the combination of 
which contributed to demands for increased freedoms within Russia and other Soviet republics -  
demands that would culminate in the breakup of the Union. Gorbachev began to authorize travel
4 James Wilson, “Ronald Reagan’s Engagement and the Cold War,” in Reagan and the World: Leadership and 
National Security 1981-1989, ed. Bradely Coleman and Kyle Longley (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky 2017), 15.
5 Ronald Granieri, “Beyond Cap the Foil: Casper Weinberger and the Reagan-Era Defense Buildup,” in Reagan and 
the World: Leadership and National Security 1981-1989, ed. Bradely Coleman and Kyle Longley (Lexington, KY: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 51.
6 Robert Service, The End o f  the Cold War: 1985-1991 (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2015), 300-15.
7 Perestroika refers to the concept of economic and political restructuring and glasnost refers to political openness.
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to Soviet-approved countries and to loosen controls on communications, giving citizens access to
other societies and to world news. Meanwhile, the Soviet government opened new
communication channels to the United States. Recognizing the liberalizing forces in the air,
Reagan pushed Gorbachev further with his dramatic “Tear down this wall!” speech at the
Brandenburg Gate of the Berlin Wall on June 12, 1987.8
We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, 
that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is 
one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance 
dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek 
peace, if  you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if  you seek 
liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, 
tear down this wall!9
Gorbachev requested a summit with President Reagan to discuss a potential decrease in 
conventional and nuclear weapons. Continued discussions ultimately led to the Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in December 1987, which 
eliminated intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles. As a result, the United States 
ceased military testing of rockets at the Poker Flats missile site north of Fairbanks.10 This action 
became the first step in both countries’ reductions of offensive capabilities and military 
spending. The signing of this treaty also led to additional arms control treaties. Based on these 
treaties and increasingly cordial relations with the Soviet Union, the United States began a 
decrease in defense expenditures. However, Reagan continued to pursue his Strategic Defense
8 Peter Robinson, “Tear Down This Wall! How Top Advisors Opposed Reagan’s Challenge to Gorbachev - but 
Lost,” Prologue Magazine 39, no. 2 (2007),
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2007/summer/berlin.html.
9 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on East-West Relations,” (speech at the Brandenburg Gate, Bermin Germany, June 12, 
1987), https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/51328/berlin.pdf.
10 Ned Rozell, “How the Cold War Inspired the Poker Flat Rocket Range’s First Launches,” Anchorage Daily News 
(Feberuary 17, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/science/2017/02/17/how-the-cold-war-inspired-the-poker- 
flat-rocket-ranges-first-launches/; Tim Wright, “The Shining: What We Still Have to Learn About the Northern 
Lights,” Air and Space Magazine (November, 2009), https://www.airspacemag.com/space/the-shining-136890354/.
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Initiative (SDI), nicknamed Star Wars, a system intended to protect the United States from 
ballistic missiles by intercepting and destroying incoming missiles in outer space.11
President George H.W. Bush continued Reagan’s push for arms control and more 
cooperation with Gorbachev when he took office in 1989. The Persian Gulf War furthered this 
new relationship between Gorbachev and Bush. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Soviet Union 
condemned Iraq, its longtime ally. Gorbachev wanted to show the United States and the world 
that it sought to end the competition between the two superpowers. In November 1990, the 
United Nations authorized a U.S.-led coalition to remove the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. This 
force ended the seven-month long occupation of Kuwait in February 1991.12
Gorbachev’s support for the United States during the crisis caused internal strife among 
the top leaders of the Soviet Union. Dimitri Yazov, the Soviet Minister of Defense, did not 
support Gorbachev and his partnership with the United States. General Vladimir Lobov, the 
commander of the Warsaw Pact, believed the presence of NATO troops in the Persian Gulf 
shifted the balance of power in NATO’s favor, with its forces now forming a line from Europe to 
the Middle East, almost the entire western border of the Soviet Union.13
Nevertheless, Gorbachev continued to pursue diplomacy and arms reductions with the 
United States. On July 31, 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to sign the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which further reduced offensive weapons, in line 
with the previous INF treaty. START reduced the deployment of nuclear weapons and limited
11 Michael Beschloss and Stobe Talbott, A t the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f the End o f the Cold War 
(Toranto, CA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 1-18. The media nicknamed SDI “Star Wars” because one 
concept was a space based laser system that would potentially provide defenses against ballistic missiles.
12 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 331-34.
13 Graham Fuller, “Moscow and the Gulf War,” Foreign Affairs 7, no. 3 (Summer,1991),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1991-06-01/moscow-and-gulf-war; Service, The End o f the Cold 
War: 1985-1991, 305.
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the number of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It removed approximately 30 percent 
of the nuclear weapons in the world.14
Immediately following the signing of START in August 1991, communist hardliners 
conducted a coup, aiming to force Gorbachev to resign. This coup failed after only three days, 
owing to the complete ineptitude and drunkenness of the reactionaries who staged the putsch. 
However, the incident destabilized the Soviet government enough to push it towards collapsing. 
Citizens of the Soviet republics watched the coup unfold, and recognized that the government 
was losing its power and control of the people. Over the next couple of months, the leaders of the 
Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics discussed dissolving the Soviet Union and 
creating a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This new alliance would coordinate 
members’ defensive and foreign policies, develop economic partnerships, and maintain military 
assets previously controlled by the Soviet Union. During this time, Gorbachev resigned as 
General Secretary of the Communist Party. These actions finalized the fall of the Soviet Union in 
late December 1991.15
In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact, the Treaty o f Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and seven eastern European countries -  Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania -  had dissolved in February 
1991, after communist governments in each of the satellite countries had been pushed from 
power. The Warsaw Pact had formed in 1955 to counter NATO’s conventional forces if it ever 
attacked the Soviet Union or its allies. The Warsaw Pact’s strength lay in the size of the military
14 Peter Boyle, American-Soviet Relations, 130.
15 Service, The End o f  the Cold War: 1985-1991, 200; Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 50.
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forces it could deploy if necessary. The organization began to dissolve in 1989 with the political 
changes taking place in Eastern Europe and with the weakening of the Soviet government.16
After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., President George Bush was eager to capitalize on 
the anticipated “peace dividend,” the savings the country could expect now that the Cold War did 
not compel the United States to spend enormous sums on both conventional and nuclear defense 
measures. He did this by proposing cuts to U.S. military forces by half a million personnel and a 
25 percent decrease in defense expenditures.17 President Bill Clinton continued these cuts when 
he took office in 1993. With the decreased number of nuclear weapons held by Russia, and no 
serious threat of nuclear war, he cut Reagan’s SDI, which had never been fully developed.18
For the two years following the Cold War, defense expenditures remained relatively 
stable due to the Gulf War; however, in 1993, a decrease in expenditures began. At the national 
level, defense spending dropped over $57 billion from 1993 to 1995. At this same time period, 
defense funding decreased in Alaska over a billion dollars from $5.7 billion to $4.4 billion. This 
funding decline coincided with a decrease in military personnel numbers in the state, which 
dropped from just over twenty-two thousand to seventeen thousand.
Defense expenditure reductions continued at the national level until 1999 by another $37 
billion. A second major decrease of $2.2 billion occurred in Alaska in 1997 corresponding to 
when the Pentagon closed both Fort Greely and Adak Naval Bases. In 1997, in conjunction with 
these base closures, troop numbers dropped by another 1,000 personnel to just under 16,000 
stationed in Alaska by the end of 1998. In summary, from 1993 to 1998 national defense
16 Gloria Lotha, “Warsaw Pact: Europe (1955-1991),” Encyclopedia Britannica, updated January 25, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact.
17 George H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons,” (speech at 
the White House, Washington D.C., September 27, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035.
18 Eric Schmitt, “Clinton Seeking $14 Billion Cut by the Military,” New York Times, February 3, 1993.
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expenditures decreased by $94 billion and at the state level by $3.5 billion. Additional personnel 
numbers at the national level dropped over 300,000 and in Alaska by 6,000 troops.
6.2.1 Realism and International Politics
Having recounted the history of the decline of military expenditures and troops in the 
United States and Alaska in the 1990s, the following discussion applies structural realism to 
these events to explain U.S. motivations in decreasing its military expenditures nationally and in 
Alaska in the years following the end of the Cold W ar.19
6.2.1.1 A state’s interests or a threat to those interests will push a nation into action 
Structural realism argues that a state’s interests or a threat to those interests will push a
nation into action. As the previous chapter illustrated, the perceived threat posed by the Soviet 
Union mounted following World War II; the United States increased its defense expenditures, 
and significant expenditures were allocated to Alaska. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the 
threat it has posed waned, and the Defense Department began to decrease military personnel and 
expenditures. The end of the Cold War decreased the conventional and nuclear threat to the 
United States and thus obviated the need for a large military to protect its interests around the 
world, including on its own soil.
6.2.1.2 These policies or actions are formed because o f competition between states 
Realism theory also states that competition drives defense expenditures. Certainly, the
nuclear arms race and other defense expenditures in both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  InternationalPolitics,W7.
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driven by competition between the two super powers to exceed the other’s military might. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War eliminated the fierce competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States could decrease its 
military size and funding while still remaining the most powerful nation in the world. President 
Bush called this savings the peace dividend. When a country no longer has to compete with 
another state, or the threat posed by the other state decreases, then a country can reduce its 
military expenditures and increase spending on other needs.
6.2.1.3 Calculation can be used to discover the policies a country will use
The United States used cost-benefit analysis and concluded that a large standing military 
and significant military spending would no longer increase its security, with the threat of the 
Soviet Union having dissipated. Such high levels of military spending within the United States 
were no longer needed. As such, it reduced Alaska’s nuclear monitoring and military training 
capabilities. The treaties signed by the United States and the Soviet Union decreased the nuclear 
weapons in the world by 30 percent and also decreased the number of ballistic missiles that could 
carry these weapons, which led the United States to reduce its defenses against such weapons. 
Also, with the Warsaw Pact now dissolved, the United States decreased its forces because the 
Soviet Union’s threat through conventional warfare largely evaporated.
6.2.1.4 Success o f these policies is shown in that a state was both preserved and strengthened 
Although the United States decreased its military size in the 1990s, following the demise
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it preserved its relative level of power and 
security in the world. As will be discussed below, these decisions impacted military expenditures 
in Alaska. The United States government determined that it needed neither extensive training
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capabilities at Fort Greely, nor the submarine monitoring system on Adak. The United States 
maintained both its security and superpower status without these facilities.
6.3 Domestic Politics
Even with the fall of the Soviet Union and the decreased international threat, a coalition 
of interests still advocated for defense expenditures in Alaska. This section will examine the 
coalition’s efforts to see what impact they had on the level of defense funding in Alaska in light 
of significant cuts in the national defense budget. The coalition had limited influence on defense 
spending in Alaska. The members of the coalition came from the national level of government 
only, which reduced the avenues available to push for defense expenditures in the state. 
Additionally, a policy diversion occurred when many potential coalition actors focused their 
attention on the oil industry in Alaska.
Following the 1968 death of Bob Bartlett, who had served as Alaska’s delegate to the 
House of Representatives since 1945 and as Alaska’s senator since it became a state in 1959, 
Alaska Governor Walter Hickel appointed attorney Ted Stevens as senator. Over the next twenty 
years, he became an influential senator, using his increasing seniority and his chairmanships of 
powerful committees to bring large amounts of national spending to Alaska. His skills in 
garnering federal funds for Alaska made him a legend among his constituents. He fought to 
defend Alaska’s interests broadly in Washington. Stevens worked on projects to improve rural 
infrastructure, social programs, logging subsidies, and a plethora of other projects. He even 
swayed the Defense Department to finance the Arctic Region Supercomputing Center at the 
University of Alaska Fairbanks to study the aurora borealis, as he believed that studying the 
aurora would lead to harnessing its power. He also worked to maintain military facilities, and
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improve housing on the remaining bases.20 With the exception of the aurora borealis project, 
Stevens did not seek funding for new defense initiatives. He worked to maintain Alaska’s 
defensive capacities and installations.
In the post-Cold War years, defense strategists perceived minimal military threats to the 
United States, including Alaska. Given the low threat level, some called for reductions in 
military spending, including the closing of military bases throughout the United States. Thus, 
when the U.S. government developed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) 
program, Alaska was not spared. Members of Congress knew that bases needed closing, but did 
not want to lose the bases in their districts. The BRAC commission would provide a non-partisan 
and objective review of the possible bases and military installations recommended by the DoD 
for closure, shielding members of Congress from making these difficult decisions. This 
commission would then provide its list to the President for approval, it would then go to 
Congress for a vote.21 The BRAC program conducted multiple years of base closure 
recommendations in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998. In 1991 and 1993 Fort Richardson, near 
Anchorage, made the list of possible closures. However, both times it avoided the final list of 
closures.22
Then, in 1995, four bases in Alaska -- Fort Richardson, Fort Wainwright, Fort Greely, 
and Adak Naval Base -- made the list of possible closures. Stevens fought to reverse the 
Pentagon’s decision to close these bases in Alaska.23 His efforts succeeded in sparing Fort 
Wainwright and Fort Richardson. The BRAC commission recommended Fort Greely for
20 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 386.
21 “About the Commision,” Defense Base Closure and Relignment Commission, accessed March 12, 2018, 
http://www.brac.gov/About.html.
22 Gerald A McBeath and Thomas A Morehouse, Alaska Politics & Government (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994), 88.
23 Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon to Seek Scaled-Back List of Base Closings,” The New York Times, February 24, 1995.
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realignment and Adak Naval Base for closure, but it was not completely shut down until 1997.24 
During the Cold War, Fort Greely had been a cold weather testing site and training location. As a 
result of BRAC, it remained a training site, but would house only a small unit to manage military 
lands near Delta Junction; remaining personnel were relocated to Fort Wainwright. The U.S. 
Navy had maintained Adak as a submarine surveillance station during the Cold War, but it was 
deemed unnecessary and closed after the Cold War.25
Throughout the Cold War, Alaska represented the United States’ prime military training 
location. The military used the vast and variable landscape land and the variety of climates 
within the state to train units from all over the country twice a year. A major training facility was 
located at Fort Greely near Delta Junction, in Alaska’s Interior. The end of the Cold War limited 
the need to conduct the costly transportation and training of large military units in the state.26 
Alaska also had provided a strategic position to locate interceptor aircraft at both Elmendorf Air 
Force Base near Anchorage and Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks that would monitor for 
Soviet reconnaissance planes. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these interceptors no longer had 
a mission in Alaska and were deactivated.27
During the Cold War, military units from across the nation would come to Fort 
Wainwright and Fort Greely twice a year, in both summer and the winter, for training; however, 
this training ceased in 1987 when the military conducted its final biannual training mission. 
Following this exercise, the Pentagon announced that these massive training exercises would 
only occur every four years in Alaska. Also during the 1987 exercise, it came to light that the
24 Department of Defense, “Report to the President on 1995 Defense Base Realignment and Closure,” (Wasington 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995).
25 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 214-15.
26 Department of Defense, “Report to the President on 1995 Defense Base Realignment and Closure.”
27 John Cloe, “The Cold War Years 1946-1991,” Alaska Historical Society, accessed March 14, 2018, 
https://alaskahistoricalsociety.org/discover-alaska/glimpses-of-the-past/the-cold-war-years-1946-1991/.
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Alaska Command (ALCOM) could not properly control an exercise this large, so the Pentagon 
altered the chain of command for Alaska’s top military commander. Following World War II, the 
ALCOM had reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which enabled the commander to 
influence top level military decisions. Beginning in 1987, the military in Alaska would report to 
the leadership of the Pacific Command, which added an additional layer of military bureaucracy. 
With this change in command structure, the Air Force Commander of ALCOM no longer had 
direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus limiting the influence of the Alaska 
Command.28
When General Joseph Ralston assumed the Alaska command in 1994, he endeavored to 
garner national defense expenditures for the state by focusing on the need for additional training 
for all American forces, in keeping with Cold War policies. While the military no longer faced a 
major international threat, Ralston argued that the military should train for any scenario that 
could potentially occur in the future. He lobbied for additional funding for military training areas 
because Alaska had the most land devoted to military operations. His efforts rendered limited 
results; the DoD funded training of military units in Alaska, although not nearly as much as 
during the Cold War.29
General Dave McCloud, who assumed the Alaska Command in 1998, continued to stress 
the need for additional training in Alaska. His campaign also requested other military generals to 
bring their units to Alaska to avail themselves of the abundant training areas, but they did not 
take advantage of the offer.30
28 Alaska Command, “Alaska Command History,” update April 2, 2015, http://www.jber.jb.mil/Units/Alaskan- 
Command/.
29 John Morrocco, “The U.S. Trains for Peacekeeping,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 140, no. 14 (1994).
30 David Fulghum, “Alaska Pushes Foreign, Joint-Service Training,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 149, no. 
12 (1998).
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During the post-Cold War era, the national media did not focus on Alaska as a 
strategically important region or on installations here as vital to the defense of the United States, 
as they had during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, Alaska’s Arctic location did not 
garner any extended news coverage. However, when the BRAC process threatened specific 
installations in Alaska, local newspapers covered the news of the impending closures, relating 
how Stevens worked in Congress to help prevent these decisions.31
Nearly three decades earlier, approximately ten years after the national government 
granted Alaska statehood in 1959, the oil industries British Petroleum, Mobil-Phillips, and 
Standard Oil located the largest oil field in North America at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s northern 
coast. Over the next thirty years, oil revenues from this field would supersede all previous 
revenue -- national defense, copper, gold, fur, and salmon -- that once supported the territory and 
state of Alaska. The peak of oil production occurred in 1980, at which time the state received 84 
percent of its revenue from oil. This new-found oil revenue provided greater self-sufficiency for 
the state, leading top officials in Alaska, including Governor Walter Hickel, to reduce their 
participation in the coalition advocating for national defense within the state. 32
However, in the early 1990s world oil prices dropped, which reduced the revenues 
accruing to the heavily oil-dependent state. State level actors feverishly sought to expand oil 
exploration and development, given the enormous potential for revenues to the state. The focus 
on expanding oil production diverted the attention of traditional defense coalition actors in 
Alaska. In 1992, Governor Hickel stated that he wanted to sue the U.S. government for 
Congress’ continued refusal to open up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration
31 David Whitney, “Fort Richardson Gains a Reprieve,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, June 9, 1991; “Alaska 
Congress Delegation Cites Ft. Richardson’s Value “ Daily Sitka Sentinel, June 5, 1991.
32 Terrence Cole and Pamela Cravez, Blinded by Riches: The Prudhoe Bay Effect (Anchorage, AK: Institute of 
Social and Economic Research, 2004); Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 351; Dermot Cole, North to the 
Future: The Alaska Story, 1959-2009 (Kenmore, WA: Epicenter Press, 2008), 140.
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and extraction. During the 1994 election cycle, oil dominated state political discussions as 
national defense spending had before World War II and during the Cold War.33 Governor Tony 
Knowles continued advocating for oil when he took office in 1995. He pushed for President 
Clinton to focus more on Alaska oil and even persuaded him to open up exports of oil.34 Oil 
remained the number one priority of Alaska’s leaders through the 1990s and into the early 2000s, 
when then Governor of Alaska Frank Murkowski said the most important thing for Alaska “in a 
single word, it’s oil.”35
6.3.1 Advocacy Coalition Framework and Domestic Politics
The period under study is 1993 to 1999, with a prelude beginning in 1987. During this 
time, a steep decrease in national defense spending occurred. Compared to the previous case 
studies, the coalition during this time period consisted of a limited number of members with 
reduced access to different sectors of government. During World War II and the beginning of the 
Cold War the actors came from both levels of government, national and state, as well as from the 
military, and they represented a strong coalition. The focus on oil revenue during the 1990s led 
to limited coalition participation, but it still exerted enough influence to reduce the amount of 
defense funding Alaska lost. The end of the Cold War severely reduced the coalition’s ability to 
advocate for additional national defense in Alaska. However, the coalition continued to push for 
defense expenditures, because the military industrial complex supported Alaska’s economy.36 
This section will consider the three premises of ACF to explain how this coalition influenced 
defense policy.
33 Naske and Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 366.
34 William Clinton, “Statement on Exports of Alaska North Slope and Crude Oil,” (memorandum Washington D.C., 
April 28, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52735.
35 Cole and Cravez, Blinded by Riches: The Prudhoe Bay Effect.
36 The military industrial complex refers to the economic connection between the military and the general public.
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6.3.1.1 The players o f the coalition must stay focused and engaged
This case shows that only a small group of individuals formed to attract national defense 
expenditures to Alaska, because efforts to expand the state’s oil revenues occupied the attention 
of state leaders. Stevens, Ralston, and McCloud were the only coalition members who actively 
lobbied for national defense dollars in Alaska. This small coalition continued to fight for national 
defense funding, but expenditures nevertheless decreased. The local news focused on the 
possible closures of the major bases in Alaska which kept the public informed and engaged. This 
local media coverage and Ted Stevens’ efforts in Washington helped to prevent potentially 
steeper cuts in defense spending. The closure of Fort Richardson or Fort Wainwright would have 
had significant negative impacts on the communities of Anchorage and Fairbanks, respectively.
6.3.1.2 The actors in a coalition should come from different levels o f government and utilize 
multiple avenues o f influence
The coalition consisted of national level officials and a small contingent of local media: 
one U.S. senator, two top level military officers and local news sources. Some of the state and 
local level actors who usually join a coalition to affect national policy did not in this case. These 
actors focused on oil and increasing oil revenues in Alaska during this time. The local media 
kept the public informed when the U.S. government identified the major military installations for 
closure, and this coverage likely indirectly pressured Senator Stevens to maintain pressure on 
policymakers.
The avenues once open to some within the coalition were now closed, for example in the 
case of the military leaders no longer having direct communication with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Military training also provided significant defense funding for Alaska; however the Pentagon 
reduced the frequency of the training to once every four years. Ralston and McCloud could not
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convince fellow generals of the value of continuing to train U.S. troops regularly for any 
scenario that could take place in the future. The fact that Ralston and McCloud lost their direct 
link to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could no longer advocate for Alaska directly greatly inhibited 
their reach within the Defense Department. These two Generals now had to report to the leader 
of the Pacific Command, who had his own priorities and opinions on what locations the military 
should focus its attention and funding on. Therefore, at best, the coalition advocating for 
Alaska’s defensive capabilities prevented an even sharper decrease than occurred in Alaska.
6.3.1.3 External shocks can help generate policy change
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the coalition lost perhaps the primary motivation for 
national defense spending in Alaska. With the Soviet threat now gone, the need for a strong 
military presence in Alaska declined. It also limited the need for the military to train to fight 
against the Soviet military. However, Alaska’s economy remained heavily dependent on defense 
expenditures, illustrating well the concept of the military-industrial complex. Therefore an 
advocacy coalition continued to lobby for defense spending in Alaska, albeit with less success 
than during World War II and the Cold War.
6.4 Conclusion
The United States sprang into action in the 1980s during the Reagan years to try and 
bring about the end of the Cold War. The United States increased its military strength to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of power. The Soviet Union soon began to 
crumble, some would argue as a direct result of the United States’ markedly increased defense 
capacities. The fall of the Soviet Union greatly diminished perceived threats to U.S. security.
This allowed the United States to decrease it military strength. As President George H.W. Bush
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anticipated, America experienced a peace dividend, given the reduced threat to its security. Thus, 
in line with realist theory, the United States modified its foreign policy by decreasing the size of 
its military and nuclear capabilities, which decreased the size of the national defense budget.
At the state level, with the Alaska coalition so small and having limited avenues to 
advocate for national defense expenditures in the state, it could not effect increases in defensive 
funding for Alaska. The Soviet Union had fallen and no longer posed a threat to the United 
States; therefore, the coalition did not have the ability to use an international event or threat as 
justification for increased military strength in Alaska. Also, the coalition had limited members 
fighting for national defense because oil held the attention of Alaska’s leaders. The coalition still 
pressed for defense expenditures in the state, because of Alaska’s reliance on military 
expenditures, evidence of the influence of the military industrial complex. This coalition appears 
to have been effective in preventing even sharper decreases in defense spending in Alaska. The 
application of both structural realism and ACF to this era reveals this decrease in defense 
spending as inevitable, given the fall of the Soviet Union and the limited number of individuals, 
with reduced avenues available to them, who were advocating for military funding in Alaska.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This thesis has endeavored to discover the international and domestic drivers of the 
increases and decreases in military strength in Alaska at critical junctures since World War II. It 
has applied structural realism and the advocacy coalition framework to cases of military influxes 
in Alaska. These cases include World War II (1940-1945), the early years of the Cold War 
(1950-1958), and the post-Cold War Era (1993-1999). This thesis has argued that both 
international and domestic politics have influenced military troop levels and defense spending in 
Alaska. Specifically, it has found that international threats have led to U.S. decisions to adopt 
deterrence and at times offensive policies that it believed would successfully defend against such 
threats, in accordance with realist theory. It has also found that coalitions formed to influence 
national policy and steer defensive capabilities to Alaska, in accordance with the advocacy 
coalition framework.
Structural realism explains states’ military policies. It specifically argues that: 1) a state 
will act in response to a threat to its national interests; 2) policies are formed due to competition 
between states; 3) states are rational actors and will weigh the costs and benefits of a given 
policy before implementing it; and 4) a state’s policy is successful when that country maintains 
its power and security. The cases addressed in this thesis comply with these tenets of realism.
The advocacy coalition framework provides a lens to examine the individuals advocating 
for a policy change and the degree of power they have to influence policy. It assumes that the 
members of a coalition must be engaged and focused to achieve an intended goal. When 
individuals from the coalition come from all levels of government, many avenues open to effect 
policy change. Finally, a coalition often uses an external shock, such as an international event, to
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persuade the public and lawmakers of a desired policy change. This thesis has shown that the 
strength of coalitions advocating for military resources in Alaska influenced the degree of 
military capabilities moved to Alaska.
Structural realism explained that during World War II the Axis powers threatened the 
United States’ security and interests, pushing it to develop its military strength and intervene in 
the war. The military sent troops to Alaska to prevent the Japanese from becoming the dominant 
power in the Pacific and to recapture the territory that the Japanese captured after the attack on 
Dutch Harbor. After the United States defeated the Japanese in the northern Pacific, the U.S. 
government moved these troops to other active theaters of the war. Meanwhile, ACF explains 
that a coalition formed in Alaska to convince policy makers that the state held strategic 
importance, providing the best location to position forces to maximize national security.
Coalition members invoked the external shock of the attack on Pearl Harbor to persuade 
lawmakers of Alaska’s strategic significance. The members of the coalition also used different 
points of access to push national policy makers for additional defensive capabilities.
Early in the Cold War, structural realism explains that the United States increased the 
size of its military in response to the Soviet Union’s dominance over eastern European countries. 
When the Soviet sphere of influence moved to East Asia, Alaska once again became the ideal 
place for troops to counter any Soviet or communist aggression. The advent of nuclear weapons 
caused the United States to build up its nuclear arsenal and create counter weapons technology at 
the expense of conventional military forces. Meanwhile, a coalition formed to lobby for 
additional defensive capabilities in Alaska to protect the United States from Soviet aggression. A 
strong coalition, it achieved its goal in attracting military assets. However, in 1956, many 
members in the coalition shifted their focus to fighting for statehood, thus destabilizing the 
military advocacy coalition, which arguably contributed to a drop in military personnel.
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In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union began to crumble, triggering a decrease in Soviet 
conventional and nuclear capabilities. This reduced the international threat to the United States. 
The United States no longer needed such a large military force and thus began to focus on what 
President George H. W. Bush termed the peace dividend. The post-Cold War period also 
showcases that a limited coalition advocated for defense expenditures in Alaska. Prior to the end 
of the Cold War, the oil industry discovered a massive oil deposit in northern Alaska. Following 
this discovery, oil became the dominant source of income for the state, which placed more focus 
on oil rather than defensive capabilities as an economic generator in the state. However, without 
the few members continued to advocate for defense expenditures in Alaska, especially U.S. 
Senator Ted Stevens, defense cuts may have been deeper. The limited coalition managed to 
prevent some major base closures in Alaska.
These findings may shed light on recent events discussed in the introduction: 1) the 
Secretary of the Air Force’s decision in April 2015 to house the new F35 Lighting aircraft in 
Alaska and 2) the Pentagon’s reversal of the July 2015 proposal to reduce the military in Alaska. 
The U.S. government acted on growing threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, while a 
coalition of actors, including Senator Lisa Murkowski, Senator Dan Sullivan, and General 
Russell Handy, influenced the decisions made in Washington to increase the military presence in 
Alaska.
When the United States faces a major international threat, it can be expected to increase 
its military presence at the national level. Additionally, a strong coalition can influence these 
policy decisions and steer capabilities to subnational levels, like Alaska. In sum, when a high 
international threat to the United States exists and a strong coalition forms, an increase in 
military power will most likely occur. Conversely, with a low international threat and a limited 
coalition, Alaska will likely experience a decrease in military assets.
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During the course of the research, I noticed limitations to this thesis. Much of the archival 
data related to the post-Cold War era remains classified due to national security. Additionally, 
Senator Ted Stevens archival collections are not available to the public at this time. When this 
information becomes accessible it could shed more light on the different avenues that the 
coalition used to advocate for defensive capabilities in Alaska. It would also help illuminate 
more on where the individuals tried to influence but failed. Another limitation came from the 
case selection. After the analysis of each case study, I determined that the World War II and the 
early years of the Cold War time periods consisted of a high international threat and a strong 
coalition; conversely, the post-Cold War era case represented a low international threat and a 
limited coalition. This unexpected discovery hindered my ability to analyze differing scenarios in 
which a low international threat and a strong coalition existed or a high international threat but a 
limited coalition occurred. Studying different cases that encompass all four situations could 
provide evidence on which variable has more power to influence national defense policy.
To enhance the validity of the study and determine whether the findings in this thesis 
apply elsewhere, future research should test them on other locations within the United States. 
Hawaii resembles Alaska in having been a territory of the United States during World War II and 
the beginning of the Cold War, and becoming a state shortly thereafter and in lying in the 
Pacific. Hawaii faced the same threats during WWII as Alaska did. Applying structural realism 
and the advocacy coalition framework to military troops and expenditures in Hawaii during the 
three eras studied here could reveal similarities and differences that could refine the findings and 
conclusions for both regions. Similarly, the theories could be applied to Texas, which has the 
second largest concentration of the military in the United States. Conducting these additional 
studies could assist in the generalizability of the findings with in this thesis.
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The prediction by General Billy Mitchell, “he who holds Alaska will hold the world, and 
I think it is the most strategic place in the world,” will continue to hold true.1 Undoubtedly, when 
international threats arise, the United States will act to counter that danger; and individuals will 
continue to argue that Alaska remains the best location to deter any such aggression. The finding 
of this thesis thus provide insight into the possibilities of the future of military forces in Alaska.
1 Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere, 30.
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